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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trusts are often employed as tools in a kind of magic act where 
they make costs associated with certain activities undertaken by trust 
beneficiaries completely disappear.  A trust beneficiary may receive 
substantial benefits to property and perhaps even virtual control over that 
property, yet the trust shields that property from costs associated with a 
beneficiary’s commission of a tort,1 a default on unsecured debt 
 
∗ Professor of Law, New England Law | Boston.  The author would like to thank Ronald Chester, 
Jeffrey Cooper, Bridget Crawford, Adam Hirsch, Tom Gallanis, Ray Madoff, Robert Sitkoff, and 
Lee-ford Tritt for their review and comments on an earlier version of this paper.  All errors, 
omissions, and lapses in judgment are the responsibility of the author.  Thanks also to Dean John F. 
O’Brien and the Board of Trustees of New England Law | Boston for a summer research stipend 
that supported this project, and to Nikki Oliveira and Cait Taylor for their research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., In re Tone’s Estate, 39 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Iowa 1949). 
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obligations, or the failure to provide for the surviving spouse at death,2 
to give a few examples.  While the outright owner of property must hold 
that property subject to the valid claims of these other parties, no 
participant in the trust arrangement undertakes these burdens.  Instead, in 
an act of hocus-pocus, they seem to simply vanish. 
Unfortunately, the magic of trusts turns out to be a chimera, as the 
costs do not really disappear; they merely resurface elsewhere, falling on 
those outside the trust relationship.3  For example, burdens placed on 
outsiders as a result of property held in trust lead to litigation over rights 
of tort creditors as against trust beneficiaries and presumably increase 
the cost of insurance and credit.4  Consider, for example, the so-called 
spendthrift trust.  The beneficiary of such a trust—who may be the 
exclusive beneficial owner of the trust property—is spared from 
exposing the source of his wealth to the claims of bilked creditors.5  Of 
course, the beneficiary is not the legal owner of the property; rather, the 
trustee has that role.6  But the rule that gives the general creditor access 
to the property interests of the owner is intended to ensure that one who 
extracts benefits from property ownership pays for those benefits.  In the 
trust, it is the beneficiary who receives all the benefits.  The trustee 
derives no income or profit from its status as nominal owner of the trust 
 
 2. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 227 
(2011); e.g., Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 341 (Mass. 2003). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. E.g., Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416 (Md. 2003) (involving a tort creditor, personal 
representative of a murder victim, seeking to invade the assets of a spendthrift trust beneficiary); 
Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. 2001) (concerning a tort creditor, victim of sexual assault 
by spendthrift trust beneficiary, seeking to invade the trust to satisfy the judgment); Embree v. 
Embree, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (involving a surviving former spouse bringing 
suit against beneficiaries of decedent’s trust to enforce a marital settlement agreement); Shuck v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 862 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing claim by surviving spouse 
against decedent-spouse’s trustee to enforce a prenuptial agreement). 
 5. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-502 (West 2009) (“A beneficiary may not transfer an 
interest in a trust in violation of a valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in 
this subchapter, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution 
by the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.02 (West 2009); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0502 (West 2007).  See also Young v. McCoy, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 847, 849 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that the assets of a discretionary support trust with a spendthrift 
provision were not ascertainable by a creditor).  But see Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, 
1028-29 (Miss. 1997) (holding that spendthrift trust assets were not protected from claims of 
intentional or gross negligence, because those claims, as a matter of public policy, prevail over 
remainder interests in spendthrift trusts). 
 6. One of the earliest justifications for the spendthrift trust was that a settlor should be 
permitted to condition his transfer any way he wanted so long as it did not violate public policy.  
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222 (2000).  But as to 
public policies against restraints on alienation, the argument is that the trustee, as legal owner, 
retains the power to sell trust property.  Id. 
2
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property.  Any benefits it gains from its role as trustee are merely 
contractual or statutory recompense for the duties it performs.  And 
besides, the trustee is not liable in any of the above instances either; it 
has no obligation to the deceased beneficiary’s surviving or divorcing 
spouse, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or the spendthrift trust 
beneficiary’s creditors.7  
The trust has been described as “essentially a gift, projected on the 
plane of time and so subjected to a management regime.”8  And in a 
succinct passage from his renowned treatise on trusts, Professor Austin 
W. Scott describes the utility of the device by offering that it allows one 
to “separate the benefits of ownership from the burdens of ownership.”9  
He means of course that the beneficiary receives all the benefits while 
the trustee takes on the burdens.  That the beneficiary enjoys the benefits 
of the trust property is unremarkable—after all, that is the whole purpose 
of the trust.10  But how are the burdens parsed out?  One way the trust 
accomplishes this is by consigning the everyday tasks of property 
management and administration to the trustee.  These tasks include:  
investing and reinvesting the assets of the trust, collecting income, 
arranging for maintenance and repair, ensuring the payment of taxes, and 
all of those other mundane if important duties—burdens, if you will—
associated with extracting economic benefits from an interest in 
property.  From this standpoint, the trust arrangement can be likened to 
the making of a contract between the settlor and the trustee, with the 
trust beneficiary as third-party contract beneficiary.  Indeed, the case has 
been made that the modern trust, primarily funded with investment 
assets and imposing significant management duties on the trustee, 
succumbs most readily to a contractual model.11  The jurisdictional 
default trust rules and fiduciary obligations supplement any terms of the 
trust instrument in this regard. 
To be sure, the management and administrative obligations taken 
on by the typical trustee are essential to the proper function of the trust.  
Property lying fallow produces little or no benefit for its beneficial 
 
 7. See infra note 14 and accompanying text for an explanation of how debtor property is 
vulnerable to creditors. 
 8. Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981) (reviewing JOHN P. 
DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES (1980)). 
 9. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1, at 2 (William F. Fratcher, ed., 4th ed. 1987). 
 10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (2003) (“[A] private trust, its terms, 
and its administration must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries . . .”). 
 11. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 638, 
643-44 (1996).  For a criticism of this view, see Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A 
Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REV. 181, 182 n.3 (2009). 
3
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owner.  If investment strategies are not employed, income and growth 
suffer.  Failure to enforce and collect rents translates to failure to benefit 
from the underlying property.  Property unmaintained loses its value.  In 
short, failure to properly manage and administer imposes costs on those 
persons with a legal right to benefit from the property.  In a trust, those 
persons are the trust beneficiaries. But these routine management and 
administrative obligations are not the only burdens associated with 
property ownership.  Property owners have other types of obligations to 
third parties—nonowners—consequent with their property interests.  For 
example, in common law jurisdictions, a married property owner has an 
obligation to provide for her surviving spouse out of her property 
interests.12  A divorcing property owner’s property is subject to division 
with the owner’s spouse.13  Likewise, an indebted property owner by 
default exposes her property to the claims of creditors in the event her 
debts go unpaid.14  And this is where a trust can do much more than just 
“separate” the burdens from the benefits of property ownership.  Rather 
than simply reassigning them to the trustee, a trust can, magically, make 
some of these burdens completely disappear, at least as far as the parties 
to the trust are concerned.15  This article serves as a call for recognition 
of what it terms these “elective externalities,” as well as a search for a 
 
 12. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 2008) (providing for an “elective 
share” of the surviving spouse against the decedent’s estate). 
 13. In divorce actions, property is divided depending on the following relevant factors: 
[C]ontribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including 
contribution of a spouse as homemaker;  
[V]alue of the property set apart to each spouse;  
[D]uration of the marriage; and  
[E]conomic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become 
effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live 
therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any children. 
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307, ALTERNATIVE B (amended 1973). 
 14. By the process of execution, attachment, and levy, an unsecured creditor can obtain a 
judgment from a court, specifically a writ of execution, and levy against the debtor’s property.  This 
process is carried out by directing the local sheriff or marshal to enforce the judgment.  ROBERT F. 
KLUEGER, A GUIDE TO ASSET PROTECTION: HOW TO KEEP WHAT’S LEGALLY YOURS 34 (1997).  
Once possession of the debtor’s property is accomplished, the creditor “becomes a lien creditor” and 
may then take priority over competing interests of other creditors.  A lien creditor is granted priority 
against unperfected interests.  U.C.C. § 9-317 (2009). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Guinn, 93 P.3d 568, 571-72 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that 
beneficiary’s trust income was separate and protected from claims by ex-spouse for division of 
marital property); Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 341 (Mass. 2003) (stating that spouse is 
not entitled to elective share of trust corpus because the trust was formed by a third party and 
decedent appointed another individual to receive the remainder of the trust); Scheffel v. Krueger, 
782 A.2d 410, 413 (N.H. 2001) (concluding that the spendthrift provision of the trust of a criminal 
defendant convicted of sexual assault on a minor was enforceable and the income and assets of the 
trust were protected against claims by the victim for damages). 
4
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practical approach to reducing them.  It takes the position that the legal 
costs trusts can inflict on third parties are often unjustifiable.16  With a 
view to preserving the efficacy of the trust, it suggests an approach that 
minimizes the burdens on outsiders and preserves much of what makes 
the trust a valuable legal tool. 
This article proceeds structurally as follows.  Part II makes the 
conceptual case for viewing the trust as an elective cost-externalization 
device.  Part III offers the spendthrift trust as the archetypal model for 
purposes of our analysis, briefly describes the spendthrift trust, and 
explores its consequences to outsiders to the trust deal.  Part IV offers 
some reasons why the elective externalities of trusts persist.  Part V first 
examines and rejects a couple of approaches to minimizing the 
externalized costs of trusts that rely on the “bundle of sticks” approach 
to property interests.  It then moves beyond the bundle of sticks 
approach, settling on a solution based on priority rules borrowed from 
legal accidents theory.  The conclusion follows in Part VI. 
II.  BRINGING THE ILLUSION TO LIGHT:  THE TRUST AS ELECTIVE 
EXTERNALIZATION TOOL 
In the language of law and economics, costs to market participants 
in general are called “externalities” or “social costs.”17  Orthodox legal-
economic theory would have it that social costs18 are resolved in the 
market, regardless of how legal entitlements are allocated—at least this 
is the case made by Ronald H. Coase in his celebrated article, The 
 
 16. See infra Part II for a discussion of this position. 
 17. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 72 (7th ed. 2007). 
 18. In a sense, I have already run off the orthodox economic rails, because since Coase’s 
famous article, it is no longer fashionable to think of these costs as being “caused” by a particular 
party’s economic activity.  The reason for the shift in focus is not so much because analysts cannot 
agree on causation, but because a search for cause does not lead us to efficient solutions.  Before 
Coase’s article, the neoclassical approach, influenced primarily by A.C. Pigou, was that a particular 
economic activity was culpable.  Costs were discouraged and curbed by one or more of taxes, 
subsidies, and regulations.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 107 (2d ed. 2006); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Title Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 396-97 (1981).  Post-Coasean economists instead maintain that 
neither party is at fault because “the qualitative relationship between the interacting parties is 
symmetrical.”  Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 28 
(1972).  Nonetheless, because I characterize the trust as an economic tool rather than an activity, I 
take the position that my reference to causation falls outside the Coasean analysis.  See supra Part 
III.  A very recent article, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou (U. 
of Iowa Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-44, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id =1275987, suggests that Coase’s work derived more from Pigou than has 
been recognized, and that Coase’s predisposition for private solutions blinded him to important 
insights made by Pigou, particularly with regard to negotiations in two-person markets.  
5
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Problem of Social Cost.19  But this does not mean that in the real world 
economic problems are always solved by markets.  Even Coase admits 
that social costs will not be resolved by negotiation where the cost of 
bargaining is prohibitively high.20  There are always costs to 
bargaining,21 and with trusts, bargaining will probably never occur. 
Second, even in the absence of transaction costs, the allocation of 
entitlements has substantial wealth effects.22  And, trust laws allocate 
entitlements and thus distribute wealth in very specific ways. 
Where transaction costs are too high, the parties will not come to an 
agreement as to how to determine the use of the property; costs will then 
fall as determined under the existing rule of legal liability.  So where a 
party calculates that it will benefit from a failure of itself and the other 
affected parties to negotiate an agreement under the current liability 
scheme because it will not legally bear some cost, it will engage in the 
activity and thus ensure that the other party will bear the cost.  
Consequently, one question that legal scholars have struggled with is:  
who should bear the cost when bargaining will not occur?23  In a 
Cosean-type example, sparks from a locomotive destroy a portion of a 
farmer’s trackside crops.  If liability falls on the farmer, and if no 
bargaining will occur because of transaction costs, the railroad owner 
will certainly steam ahead, ignoring the crop damage.  Likewise, if 
liability falls on the railroad, the farmer will sow away, regardless of the 
crops’ proximity to the railroad tracks.  In these examples, because 
bargaining will not occur, the assignment of legal liability to one party 
acts to externalize the cost on behalf of the other. 
What does this have to do with trusts?  To answer that question, we 
must first keep in mind that the trust does not represent an economic 
activity in and of itself.  Unlike ranching or manufacturing, for example, 
the trust is simply a way of slicing up legal interests and obligations 
 
 19. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).  The Coase article 
is probably responsible, more than any other factor, for economics’ foray into legal analysis and has 
been cited many thousands of times in legal journals.  See, e.g., MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 
18, at 98-99; POSNER, infra note 17, at 191; STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 103-09 (2004). 
 20. Coase, supra note 19, at 15-16. 
 21. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 51 (explaining that there are almost always 
transaction costs in bargaining, which are usually very high). 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See Coase, supra note 19, at 2; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 
(1972). 
6
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relating to property ownership.24  To illustrate why this is important, 
suppose we have a manufacturing company (“Company”) that makes 
widgets.  Suppose further that a byproduct of the manufacturing process 
is a corrosive which can build up inside the manufacturing equipment.  
Though the effects of the corrosive are somewhat unpredictable, at times 
it can shut down the equipment.  When this happens, Company must 
have the equipment cleaned of the corrosive at significant cost to 
Company.  Now suppose that, for a certain sum, Company can purchase 
and install gadget (“Gadget”), a device that eliminates the possibility of 
the corrosive building up on the machinery.  The cost of Gadget to 
Company is significantly less than the risk and associated cost of 
removing the corrosive from Company’s equipment after it causes 
equipment failure.  Gadget works by diverting the corrosive from the 
manufacturing equipment onto the adjoining land, where it is unable to 
affect the machinery of Company.  It does, however, contaminate the 
water supply of the adjoining landowner (“Landowner”).  So Gadget 
does not eliminate the cost of the corrosive but rather externalizes it.  
Question:  Will Company use Gadget to reduce its costs?  Answer:  If 
Company is liable for damage to adjoining landowners, then it depends 
on whether the value of Gadget to Company exceeds the value to 
Landowner of having its property corrosive-free.  Company will be 
willing to pay Landowner up to that amount for permission to divert the 
corrosive.25  But if Company is not liable, then Company will always use 
Gadget unless Landowner pays Company a sufficient amount to refrain.  
If no bargaining will occur, Company will always use Gadget.  Whether 
Landowner pays Company a sufficient sum to stop using Gadget or not, 
Company comes out ahead.  So where the liability for the externalized 
cost falls on the third party and no bargaining will occur, then Gadget, or 
any such gadget, as a device for externalizing costs, will always be 
employed. 
The trust is, in part, like Gadget, in that it often functions as a tool 
to offload the costs of benefiting from property onto outsiders.  To the 
extent that trusts externalize costs, so long as liability for those 
externalized costs falls on third parties, the trust makes economic sense 
to the trust insiders.  The trust is not an economic activity, like 
manufacturing or farming, where the externalities are inadvertent and 
fortuitously generated byproducts of the activities at hand.  Instead, 
 
 24. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 1 (defining a trust “as a fiduciary relationship in which 
one person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that interest 
for the benefit of another.”). 
 25. See Coase, supra note 19, at 13. 
7
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trusts are covers draped over existing activities and are often used solely 
to deflect otherwise private costs—an elective process, if you will.  The 
actual economic activities engaged in by trusts can be conducted without 
these social costs.26  Take, for example, the spendthrift clause.27  The 
sole purpose of fitting a trust with a spendthrift clause is to jettison the 
cost of debt-exposure so that it falls on those outside the trust deal.28  
This has nothing to do with any property-management functions of the 
trust.  Bernard Rudden’s management scheme cast across the temporal 
plane, where the trust settlor is merely contracting with the trustee to 
provide management and investment services and administrative 
functions does not generally impose costs on third parties.29  
Some may criticize my use of the term “externality” to describe this 
process by pointing out that any externalized costs are not the direct 
result of the beneficial interest in the trust property but rather result from 
an action taken by the beneficiary—the commission of a tort for 
example.  Under this view, it is not the trust that creates the externality.  
Instead, the activity that the beneficiary engages in does.  But this does 
not diminish my point, which is that the trust changes the effect of the 
activity from one that internalizes a particular negative cost to one that 
externalizes that cost.  And because property owners have economic 
incentives to externalize negative costs, they often employ trusts as tools 
for doing so.30 
III.  PRACTICAL LEGERDEMAIN:  THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST 
Because we are going to be applying proposed new approaches to 
reducing the externalities created by trusts, we will need a type of trust 
to serve as our model.  I would like to focus on the difficult situation of 
the spendthrift trust, which is now enabled by statute in all American 
 
 26. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, trusts do at least two things.  First, they 
allow a gift to be made to beneficiaries across time because they engage the trustee as manager and 
administrator of the property that is gifted.  See supra Part I.  Second, they permit the externalizing 
of certain costs of owning property.  Id. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. For the type of costs created by the spendthrift trust’s debt-shielding function, see infra 
Part III. 
 29. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 30. Others have alluded to the cost-externalization properties of certain types of trusts.  See 
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the 
R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2115 (2003); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, or the RAP has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 605 
(2000); Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An 
Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 820 (2002).  
8
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jurisdictions.31  Spendthrift trusts simply purport to deny to the 
beneficiary the ability to alienate the beneficial trust interest—even 
“involuntarily.”32 This means, of course, that neither a creditor nor any 
other nonparty to the trust can reach the trust assets, whether or not the 
beneficiary wishes to make them available.  I have decided to use the 
spendthrift trust as our model here for a few reasons.  First, spendthrift 
trusts are easy to create; in most jurisdictions a trust may be made 
spendthrift simply by decree of the settlor expressed in the instrument 
creating the trust.33  Second, the spendthrift trust very clearly puts the 
debtor who is a trust beneficiary in a different position than the debtor 
who is the owner of non-trust property.  Unlike property found outside 
the trust, the property that benefits a spendthrift trust beneficiary is not 
 
 31. See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2007 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 9-43 to -
75 (2006).  See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2000): 
(a) A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary 
transfer of a beneficiary’s interest.  
(b) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held subject to a 
“spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary and 
involuntary transfer of a beneficiary’s interest. 
In contrast to American law, since the 1811 case of Brandon v. Robinson, England does not 
recognize spendthrift trusts.  See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in 
the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1198-99 (1985).  This points up a big difference 
between American and English law with respect to the dead hand rights of decedents as against the 
living.  In the words of one commentator, “English law reasoned that after the trust creator died, the 
property belonged to the living beneficiaries of the dead creator’s largesse once they came of age.”  
RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 47 (2007).  Chester 
traces the development in the United States of the so-called “Claflin doctrine,” which holds that 
irrevocable trusts can only be modified or terminated by the beneficiaries if to do so would be 
counter to a “material purpose” of the settlor.  Id. at 44-53.  In contrast, English law regards the trust 
property as belonging to the beneficiaries after the settlor’s death.  Id. at 50.  Professor Chester’s 
book is critical of the strong protections given dead hand control in the United States.  Professor 
Ray Madoff, in a more recent treatment, is in accord.  See generally RAY D. MADOFF, 
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 84-85 (2010). 
 32. Never mind that if the alienation is not voluntary it should by definition not be under the 
control of the beneficiary (or the settlor for that matter).  Bogert describes the spendthrift trust less 
euphemistically as “one in which, by direction of the settlor or as a result of a statute, a trust 
beneficiary cannot alienate the right to payments, and the beneficiary’s creditors may not subject the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust to the beneficiary’s debts.”  BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 221.  
For my further commentary on the concept of involuntary alienation, see infra Part III.B. 
 33. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(b) (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.050 (West 
2009) (“No specific language is necessary for the creation of a spendthrift trust.  It is sufficient if by 
the terms of the writing (construed in the light of this chapter if necessary) the creator manifests an 
intention to create such a trust.”); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(b) (Vernon 2009) (“A 
declaration in a trust instrument that the interest of a beneficiary shall be held subject to a 
‘spendthrift trust’ is sufficient to restrain voluntary or involuntary alienation of the interest by a 
beneficiary to the maximum extent permitted by this subtitle.”).  
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exposed to the claims of creditors.34  This is, of course, what makes the 
trust spendthrift.  The costs associated with unpaid claims against a 
spendthrift trust beneficiary are externalized, so the spendthrift trust 
imposes costs on parties outside the trust deal.35  Third, spendthrift trusts 
have received surprisingly little negative criticism from legal scholars in 
the last one hundred years or so.36  Finally, spendthrift trusts are now 
recognized in all American jurisdictions,37 and are specifically enabled 
 
 34. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-502 (West 2009) (“A beneficiary may not transfer an 
interest in a trust in violation of a valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in 
this subchapter, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the interest or a distribution 
by the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-545.02(C) (West 2009); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0502 (West 2009).  See also Young v. McCoy, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 847, 849 
(Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that the assets of a discretionary support trust with a spendthrift 
provision were not ascertainable by a creditor). 
 35. This is explored more fully infra Part III. 
 36. See, e.g., George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which are Miscalled 
“Spendthrift Trusts” Reexamined, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 472-74 (1934); Note, A Rationale for the 
Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1964); Willard M. Bushman, The (In)Validity of 
Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REV. 304, 309, 312-13 (1967); Laurene M. Brooks, A Tort-Creditor 
Exception to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 
109 (1989); Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. 
REV. 179, 182-83 (1993); Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed A Trust and Starve a Child: The Effectiveness of 
Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 
696 (1994); Justin W. Stark, Montana’s Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 57 MONT. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1996).  The recent enabling in some 
jurisdictions of “self-settled” spendthrift trusts has generated some renewed interest in the subject.  
See Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685-86 
(2006); Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
1195, 1198-99 (2000); John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust 
Asset Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2621, 2623-24 (2006); John K. Eason, Developing the Asset 
Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2002); Randall 
J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987, 989-90 (1999); 
Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 479, 485 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the 
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1043-44 (2000); David B. Young, The Pro Tanto Invalidity of 
Protective Trusts: Partial Self-Settlement and Beneficiary Control, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 807, 810-11 
(1995); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
287, 289 (2002).  The Uniform Probate Code’s codification of the spendthrift trust has also 
generated some commentary:  Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of 
Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2551, 2552-53 (2006); Alan Newman, Spendthrift 
and Discretionary Trusts: Alive and Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 567, 568-69 (2005); Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the 
Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 771-72 (2002); 
Timothy J. Vittolo, Uniform Trust Code Section 503: Applying Hamilton Orders to Spendthrift 
Interests, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 169, 172 (2008); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, In Search of a 
Unifying Principle for Article V of the Uniform Trust Code: A Response to Professor Danforth, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2609, 2609 (2006).  An explanation for the spendthrift trust’s intransigence is 
made in Part IV infra. 
 37. Stark, supra note 36, at 211 (“The vast majority of states recognize spendthrift trusts as 
valid, yet these states nearly all provide for exceptions to spendthrift trusts under certain 
10
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by the Uniform Trust Code,38 making spendthrift trusts an entrenched 
part of the American law of trusts.  Because spendthrift trusts are 
primarily statutory, courts lack the power to completely deny a 
beneficiary the benefits of a spendthrift trust clause.  Yet, courts are 
empowered to define the scope of spendthrift protection.39  So, where 
spendthrift trusts are concerned, the analysis offered here should be 
considered in two contexts.  First, it merits legislative consideration in 
enacting spendthrift trust statutes.  Second, it recommends that courts 
subject the externalized costs of spendthrift trusts to a priorities approach 
in determining whether some of those costs should be redirected to the 
trust beneficiary.40 
A. The Spendthrift Trust as Elective Externalization Archetype 
This section undertakes an analysis of the spendthrift trust, skipping 
that which does not materially affect the property interests of outsiders 
to the trust deal.41  Spendthrift trusts present an anomaly in that they 
 
circumstances.”).  See also JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & 
ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 549 (7th ed. 2005) (“The spendthrift trust is 
today recognized throughout the United States.”).  In contrast, most jurisdictions do not permit the 
self-settled spendthrift trust.  The majority of jurisdictions expressly prohibit these particular trusts.  
SCHOENBLUM, supra note 31, at 9-43 to -61. 
 38. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2000). 
 39. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 211.  See also Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cnty., 
704 So. 2d 1020, 1029 (Miss. 1997) (holding that a spendthrift trust, though generally valid, could 
not shield a beneficiary’s property from tort claims arising from the beneficiary’s intentional or 
gross negligence); Timothy J. Vitollo, supra note 36, at 181 (noting that the Restatement comments 
indicate that Sligh may be influential elsewhere).  Vitollo goes on to note that Sligh was overruled, 
but Louisiana amended its statute to bring it in line with the holding in Sligh.  Id. at 182.  A number 
of jurisdictions have limited the protections provided by spendthrift provisions.  See, e.g., 20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 7743(b)(1)-(4) (2006) (exempting “a beneficiary’s child, any person who has a court 
order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance, a judgment creditor who has provided 
services for the protection of the beneficiary’s interest in the trust, and a claim of the United States 
or the Commonwealth as allowed by federal law”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-501 (2006) (allowing 
the court to “authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary’s interest by 
attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary or other means”); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-503(b) (2006) (permitting a beneficiary’s child who has a judgment or 
court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance to attach distributions made to the 
beneficiary or for the benefit of the beneficiary); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10503(A) (2009) 
(allowing “a beneficiary’s child who has a judgment or court order against the beneficiary for 
support or maintenance, or a judgment creditor who has provided services relating to the protection 
of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust” to obtain a court order attaching distributions to or for the 
benefit of the beneficiary). 
 40. See infra IV.B. 
 41. Others have addressed some of the internal effects.  For example, Robert Sitkoff points 
out that spendthrift trusts reduce agency costs (as compared to discretionary trusts, which also have 
a debtor protection function) because they can allow mandatory distributions to the beneficiary, 
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allow a beneficiary to enjoy a legally enforceable mandatory stream of 
benefits from property while shielding the source of those benefits, and 
indeed the benefits themselves, from exposure to the beneficiary’s 
creditors.42  The given justification for spendthrift trusts does not depend 
on the type of assets placed in the trust or on the amount of wealth 
contained in the trust.43  In contrast, certain types of assets might be 
protected from the claims of creditors outside of the spendthrift trust 
arena, but those exemptions are based on policy considerations either 
associated with discrete and specific assets, or limited to a certain 
maximum value of assets.  For example, federal law limits creditor 
access to a debtor’s qualified retirement plans,44 in part so that a debtor 
living off of such a plan does not become impoverished and dependent 
on the government.45  Likewise, states might make individual retirement 
accounts exempt or partially exempt from creditors’ claims, or might set 
aside a portion of the homestead for protection.46  Whether one agrees 
with the premise from which these laws originate or not, they are 
purported to be based on specific policies unique to those assets.  At the 
federal level, bankruptcy laws give debtors a minimum amount of 
exempt property in order to engender a “fresh start.”47  In contrast, 
virtually any asset can be placed in a spendthrift trust.  And, there are no 
limits on the amount of benefit the spendthrift trust can produce for the 
 
eliminating the agent’s discretion.  Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 674-75 (2004).  I do not address internal consequences because this paper is 
not concerned with the question of whether the spendthrift trust is a good idea for the settlor and the 
beneficiary, but rather how it affects the third party.  But the question of whether the spendthrift 
trust is really good for the settlor seems almost tautological.  If a settlor chooses to employ a 
spendthrift trust, then the settlor has concluded that the device creates value for the settlor and the 
beneficiary.  After all, settlors do not give away money to those they do not wish to benefit.  And 
the beneficiary is getting a beneficial property interest for free, so if there are strings attached and 
the beneficiary does not like those strings, well then the beneficiary is free to reject or disclaim the 
gift.  For this reason, for purposes of this paper I am willing to assume that spendthrift trusts are 
good for the settlor and the beneficiary.  My concern is whether they are good for others, either 
society as a whole or any group of unrelated third parties that might be defined more particularly. 
 42. See id. at 674. 
 43. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
 44. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).  See also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759 
(1992). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Seltzer, 159 B.R. 329, 332 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993); In re Brilley, 148 B.R. 
39, 42 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992); In re Walker, 139 B.R. 31, 33 (N.D. Okla. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 894 
(10th Cir. 1992).  See also Ward J. Wilsey, Asset Protection for Californians with IRAs and ERISA 
Plans, http://www.keepandshare.com/doc/1292007/asset-protection-for-iras-and-401ks-91k?dn=y. 
 46. See, e.g., In re Luttge, 204 B.R. 259, 263 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 47. See Eason, supra note 36, at 46.  Eason notes that, in contrast, the spendthrift trust has 
been criticized as a device that can “actually discourage a productive lifestyle.”  Id. at 47. 
12
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beneficiary; the trust can be funded with wealth of boundless value and 
can provide for distributions of any amount and in any manner. 
The origin of the spendthrift trust in the United States is generally 
attributed to the case of Nichols v. Eaton.48  Though the case concerned a 
discretionary trust with no explicit spendthrift provision, Justice Samuel 
Freeman Miller’s opinion gratuitously ventured from the facts at hand 
and offered dictum, which subsequently served to legitimize the 
spendthrift trust.49  Miller primarily based his position on the settlor’s 
freedom of disposition of her property.50  Sounding an emotional appeal 
to a donor’s desire to benefit loved ones, he said quite simply that he 
found no reason to rule that a donor should not be able to give property 
away and make it exempt from the claims of the donee’s creditors.51  As 
to the effect on the rights of the third parties, he noted that all states had 
laws exempting certain types of property from creditors’ claims, and that 
creditors under contracts made after those laws took effect could not 
look to exempt property for satisfaction of their claims.52  
The objection to Justice Miller’s primary claim seems rather 
obvious.  Once the property is given away, it is no longer the property of 
the settlor.  So, how is it that the settlor should be able to dictate the 
rights of outsiders to the property he no longer owns? Yet, subsequent 
 
 48. 91 U.S. 716, 730 (1875).  The first, and one of the most noted, state court cases to follow 
the Nichols dicta was Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 172-73 (1882). 
 49. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875) (“[T]his court does not wish it understood that 
it accepts the limitations which [the English] court has placed upon the power of testamentary 
disposition of property by its owner.”).  As has been pointed out in other commentary, even Justice 
Miller acknowledged that he was venturing afield to reject the English limitations on spendthrift 
trusts.  See Eason, supra note 36, at 40.  The English position denying the viability of restraining 
alienability of the beneficial trust interest is usually attributed to the case of Brandon v. Robinson, 
(1811) 34 Eng. Rep. 379.  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 31, at 1198-99. 
 50. Nichols, 91 U.S. at 727.  
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing 
the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the 
vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, 
should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.  
Id.  
 51. Id. at 725.  
But the doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing 
of it, cannot so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing in 
return, must hold it subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon deprive 
him of all the benefits sought to be conferred by the testator’s affection or generosity, is 
one which we are not prepared to announce as the doctrine of this court. 
Id.  
 52. See generally id. at 726 (offering no commentary as to the rights of involuntary creditors). 
13
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defenders of the spendthrift trust continue to strike Miller’s chord.53  For 
example, Professor Adam Hirsch defends the refusal to allow 
involuntary creditors of the spendthrift trust beneficiary to reach the trust 
assets on the basis that the settlor owed no duty to them.54  He states that 
because the settlor lacks a moral obligation to the beneficiary’s creditors, 
this may “neutralize” the beneficiary’s moral obligation to satisfy their 
claims with the distributions made to beneficiary.55  But, he ignores that 
once the settlor transfers the property to the trust, the settlor no longer 
has any interest whatsoever in the property.  Perhaps the settlor’s lack of 
an obligation to the beneficiary’s creditors is relevant before the settlor 
acts on his decision to benefit the beneficiary with the settlor’s (now 
former) property, but it cannot possibly be germane once the settlor 
takes this action.56  Under parallel reasoning, I should not have to pay 
my creditors because my money came from my employer and my 
employer had no duty to my creditors.  If a trust beneficiary’s creditors 
have a legislatively-given right to a portion of property in which the 
beneficiary has rights, it seems odd that a settlor can be assumed to have 
a judicially-created trump card that trounces on the rights of those 
creditors.  The proposition is especially unconvincing when one 
considers that the settlor no longer has any economic interest in the 
property given to the beneficiary. 
Some time should be taken here to address the claim of those who 
contend that to allow a property owner to withhold from a donee the 
“right” of involuntary alienation of a donated property interest is simply 
to recognize that the donor’s right of alienation includes the right to 
disaggregate the bundle of sticks contained in the donated interests. 
First, from a purely formalistic standpoint, the sticks in the property 
bundle are conceived of as various “rights (or claims), privileges, 
powers, and immunities.”57  These are all attributes of property that give 
 
 53. As one commentator has stated, this argument “continues to provoke enthusiastic 
agreement and astonished disagreement.”  Emanuel, supra note 36, at 193.  Indeed, “[t]o say it is the 
settlor’s property both begs the question and confuses the analysis.  It once was the settlor’s 
property, but it no longer is.”  Id.  
 54. Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 78 (1995). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Cf. Professor Emanuel’s response to this line of reasoning:  “Simply stated, Justice 
Miller’s position [in Nichols v. Eaton] seems to be, ‘It’s the settlor’s property; the settlor can do as 
he wishes with it.’  The response is obvious:  it is not the settlor’s property; rather, it is the 
beneficiary’s property.”  Emanuel, supra note 36, at 193. 
 57. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917).  Hohfeld is the scholar most closely associated with the 
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the owner some advantage over the non-owner with respect to the 
property.58  Burdens that come with those sticks, such as creditor-
exposure, are a different sort of conception altogether.  It is difficult to 
conceive of a stick called “involuntary alienation.”  That is because the 
“right” of involuntary alienation is a right of a third-party to the trust 
property, not a right of the owner.  We are supposed to conclude that, 
because the trust interest cannot be involuntarily alienated by the 
beneficiary, the third party’s rights to proceed against it are restricted.  
But, this is a perfect example of begging the question.  The proposition 
is explicitly stated in the premise.  As a legal statement, it is incoherent 
and points to purposeful obfuscation.  Finally, even if one takes the 
questionable position that the power to alienate property includes the 
power to strip away the rights of third-parties with respect to the 
transferee owner, this power conflicts with the power of the subsequent 
owner to dispose of the property as the new owner pleases.59  This 
conflict must be resolved if one takes the position that property should 
be freely alienable, and is further explored with respect to the spendthrift 
trust in the next section. 
B. Restraining the Alienation of the Beneficial Interest 
Irrespective of the awkwardness presented by the involuntary 
alienation concept,60 the spendthrift trust is often described as a trust 
under which the beneficiary’s interest is not subject to voluntary or 
involuntary alienation.61  In any event, it sharply limits the rights of 
 
bundle of rights concept.  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 
1532 (2003). 
 58. For example, the owner’s sticks allow the owner to prevent others from trespassing on the 
property or physically harming it, allow the owner to use the property in various ways to the 
owner’s benefit, to transfer it to another, to prevent others from wrongful taking of the property.  
See Hohfeld, supra note 57, at 746-47. 
 59. For a thorough examination of how this question was perceived but never fully resolved 
from the pre-Classical period through the end of the twentieth century, see generally Alexander, 
supra note 31, at 1195-97. 
 60. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 61. Actually, as Hirsch points out, the two are not dependent on one another and offer 
different advantages for the beneficiary.  See Hirsch, supra note 54, at 8 n.23, 72 nn.265-66.  Hirsch 
criticizes certain members of the estate planning bar for being “insufficiently careful to separate the 
appeals of voluntary and involuntary restraints.”  Id. at 58 n.206.  In reference to an estate planner 
who pointed out that even the fiscally responsible beneficiary could benefit from the spendthrift 
trust because of “unexpected claims,” Hirsch says those types of beneficiaries need only involuntary 
and not voluntary restraints on alienation.  Id.  But because lack of caution can get a practitioner’s 
name in print in the wrong venues, one would not want to strip out the voluntary portion from the 
trust unless one had very good reason to do so.  Doing so highlights the lopsidedness of the law 
regarding spendthrift trusts, which is not something an estate planning attorney wants his client 
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creditors generally by blocking all routes to trust assets in satisfaction of 
a claim against the beneficiary.62  But, the spendthrift trust’s effect on 
creditors is indirect only and is generally derived through deductive 
application of the language of the spendthrift statute.  The typical statute 
formally describes the provision as a mechanism that merely alters the 
beneficiary’s—not the creditor’s—relationship to the trust assets; it 
purports only to suppress the beneficiary’s power to alienate the 
beneficial trust interest.63  We are thus encouraged to conceive of the 
provision as one that merely denies to the beneficiary a couple of sticks 
in the property bundle.  The first stick denied is that which would permit 
the beneficiary to voluntarily alienate the beneficial trust interest.64  If a 
settlor is free to alienate his property as he pleases, then it certainly 
seems to follow that the settlor has the power to deny the trust 
beneficiary the right to convey the beneficial interest.  Viewed this way, 
a trust is a device that disaggregates the sticks in the bundle of 
ownership. 
The deductive effect of denying the beneficiary the power to 
convey is that the beneficiary thus has no power to grant a creditor a 
security interest in the beneficial trust interest.  This takes care of 
consensual security interests.  But this feature alone will not foreclose 
creditors’ rights against the trust property.  Even unsecured creditors 
may proceed against property of their debtors where the debtor is in 
 
drawing attention to; in other words, does it make sense that even though the beneficiary can 
transfer his interest, his creditors cannot reach it?  And the fact is, it is rarely a problem to keep the 
restriction on voluntary alienation in the trust.  As a rule, beneficiaries do not sell or encumber their 
interests in trusts and would rarely, if ever, even have occasion or opportunity to do so. 
 62. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2000).  Under the UTC, a “spendthrift provision” is 
defined as a term in a trust instrument that “restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a 
beneficiary’s interest.”  UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 103(16), 502(a) (amended 2004). 
 63. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a) (amended 2004) (“A spendthrift provision is valid 
only if it restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary’s interest.”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 166.020 (2009) (“A spendthrift trust is defined to be a trust in which by the terms thereof a 
valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is 
imposed.”); FLA. STAT. § 736.0502(1) (2009) (using the same language as the UTC); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 58a-502(b) (2004) (“A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held 
subject to a ‘spendthrift trust,’ or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain both voluntary and 
involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.”); WISC. STAT. § 701.06(1) (2001) (“A settlor may 
expressly provide in the creating instrument that the interest in income of a beneficiary other than 
the settlor is not subject to voluntary or involuntary alienation.”). 
 64. Kate Shelby, Taking Public Interests in Private Property Seriously: How the Supreme 
Court Short-Changes Public Property Rights in Regulatory Takings Cases, 24 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45, 47-48 (2008).  “Using the bundle of sticks metaphor, rights in property are defined 
only with regard to the individual landowner, with each stick representing a right that a property 
owner holds against others, including the rights to possess, alienate, and use the property and the 
right to exclude others.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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default or the creditor has attained a judgment against the debtor.65  The 
property owner’s prearranged consent is not required.66  One would 
think that the only way a spendthrift trust statute could deny the creditors 
this important right would be to provide, quite directly, that the trust 
property is exempt from creditors’ claims.  Instead, the spendthrift 
statute very cleverly purports to allow a beneficial trust interest to be 
devoid of “involuntary” as well as voluntary alienation features.67  But if 
involuntary alienation is merely a stick that goes along with ownership, 
then it is one stick that most property owners would happily do without.  
Indeed, most of us must resort to a lock and key for this purpose.68  Even 
so, if we are unlucky or hapless enough to default on our credit 
obligations or to be held liable for damages in tort, we are subject to 
being legally and forcibly relieved of a corresponding amount of our 
property, though we would certainly prefer that it not be so.  
The point, however, is that to couch the debtor-protection features 
of a spendthrift trust in the language of alienability is to obscure their 
effect.  This can be made clearer by describing the device in terms of its 
loss to the creditor.  To prohibit “involuntary alienation” is to quite 
directly shift a portion of the cost of credit onto the creditor.  A legal 
entitlement has been reallocated.  So to focus on how the inability to 
alienate makes the trust spendthrift, instead of confronting the debtor 
protection feature head-on, obscures the externalization issue and 
indulges in formalistic reasoning that is best avoided.  Consider the 
process:  A judge is faced with creditor (“C”) who wishes to attach an 
interest in trust (“T”) to satisfy an unpaid debt of beneficiary (“B”).  The 
judge reviews the trust’s governing instrument and notes that it provides 
that B’s interest in the trust cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily 
alienated.  From this, the judge reasons that B could not have given C a 
security interest in T (voluntary alienation) and further that C cannot 
simply seize T to satisfy the debt of B (involuntary alienation).  The 
judge deduces from the prohibition on alienation that C cannot be 
granted access to the trust property.  C loses.  The problem is that the 
judge does not face the question whether B should be able to benefit 
from the trust property and yet not have that property exposed to the 
claims of creditors.  The focus on the question of “alienation” then has a 
 
 65. See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:18 (2010). 
 66. See id. 
 67. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a) (2000). 
 68. On a larger scale, police forces and armies come to mind. 
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tendency to obscure the real issue.69  While the beneficiary versus 
creditor alienation features of trusts can be separately debated, the 
bottom line is that a trust can generally be made spendthrift by simply 
declaring that it be so.70  The question is whether this is good or bad, not 
whether we can deduce a loss for the creditor from the legal restriction 
on alienation. 
This is not to say that voluntary versus involuntary alienation is not 
worth analysis in and of itself.  Hirsch takes pains to point out that we 
should separately analyze these two types of alienation.71  For the record, 
I would note that any restriction on voluntary (but not involuntary) 
alienation could be accomplished through a simple contract with 
someone (in a trust, the trustee) whereby a third-party beneficiary (in a 
trust, the beneficiary) is prevented from voluntarily alienating the 
property.72  Involuntary alienation is another matter.  Because debtor 
protection is purported to be enabled by simply disallowing involuntary 
alienation, then involuntary alienation is of interest here. 
But even if we were to concede for the sake of argument that 
something called “involuntary alienation” could be restricted, is it a 
 
 69. To describe the debtor protection features of a spendthrift trust as a restriction on 
involuntary alienation also obscures the point from an expressive view of property.  See Jane B. 
Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 208, 212 (2002) (defining 
the term “expressive view” as conveying the idea that “legal actions ‘carry meanings’ and signal 
‘attitudes and commitments’”).  I would also note that statutes making certain types of property 
exempt from creditors’ claims in other contexts (e.g., life insurance, pensions plans, etc.) are not 
generally analyzed from the alienability-inalienability perspective and the debtor-protection features 
of such property is usually referred to by referring to the property as “exempt property.”  WILLIAM 
HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:74 (2009) (“Currently, every state 
grants important exemptions for life insurance from collection by the owner’s creditor.”).  “Under 
exemption law, states also limit the access of creditors to the debtor’s income. Indeed, a few states 
flatly prohibit garnishment of wages.  The state wage exemption statutes affect various forms of 
income, including wages, pensions, and public assistance payments.”  Id. § 6:73.  See, e.g., MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 125 (1998) (stating that life insurance policies are exempt from creditors’ 
claims); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-453(a) (1990); FLA. STAT. § 222.13(1) (1995). 
 70. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(b) (“A term of a trust providing that the interest of a 
beneficiary is held subject to a “spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is sufficient to restrain 
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-
502(2) (2010) (stating similar language to the Uniform Trust Code, although Idaho has not yet 
adopted the Uniform Trust Code); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(b) (Vernon 2009) (stating the 
same as the Uniform Trust Code, although Texas has not yet adopted the Uniform Trust Code). 
 71. Hirsch goes so far as to chastise a commentator on the devices for paying insufficient 
attention to this aspect of the devices.  Hirsch, supra note 54, at 58 n.206. 
 72. Compare John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625, 646-53 (1995) (comparing trusts to contracts), with Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-
Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REV. 181, 181 n.1 (2009) (criticizing Langbein’s ideas 
regarding similarities between trusts and contracts, stating that trust law is capable of achieving 
more favorable results than contract law in certain circumstances). 
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good idea to do so?  From a classical legal-economic perspective, 
restrictions on alienation are suspect, if not presumptively problematic.73  
Many who acknowledge the principle quickly dispose of the concern 
where the spendthrift trust is concerned by asserting that the rule is 
inapposite as applied to the trust, because the trustee holds legal title to 
all the trust assets and is subject to no such restriction.74  But this 
statement simply uses trust-speak to sidestep the question. Yes, the 
trustee of the spendthrift trust is free to alienate the underlying asset (that 
is one of the trustee’s roles), but the underlying asset is not what the 
beneficiary would have to give to the creditor anyway.75  What the 
trustee cannot alienate and what the creditor would be entitled to under 
general law is the value of the beneficiary’s interest in that asset or any 
other asset that the trustee decides to replace it with in the event that it is 
alienated—the beneficiary’s “beneficial interest” in whatever property 
the trustee decides is an appropriate investment in the trust.76  That the 
beneficiary only has equitable title is true as a technical description,77 
but this does not mean that we can end the inquiry there and go 
searching for the “real owner.”  As in the case of deducing that debtor 
protection should follow inexorably from inalienability,78 it smacks of 
formalist reasoning.  Justifications based solely on the trust law title-split 
fiction are suspect.79  The better question is whether the fact of a 
 
 73. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1451 (2009) 
(discussing how there is “good reason to be suspicious of inalienability”); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability 
and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Why 
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971 (1985). 
 74. Erickson v. Erickson, 266 N.W. 161, 163 (Minn. 1936) (finding no restraint on alienation 
because trustees can transfer legal title); Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 171-72 
(1882) (upholding a trust spendthrift provision as not being void as against public policy because 
the right of the trustee to alienate the underlying property); Hirsch, supra note 54, at 10; Martha W. 
Jordan, Requiem for Pennsylvania’s Rule Against Perpetuities?, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 555, 561 n.40 
(2008); B. Redman, Entitlement of a Surviving Spouse: A Quandary, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 573, 605 
(1999). 
 75. Gregory S. Alexander, Dead Hand Control and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth 
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1985) (pointing out “equity had quite early regarded the 
beneficial interest as assignable property.”).  
 76. See Eason, supra note 36, at 31. 
 77. Actually it is somewhat misleading because the proceeds of any sale of trust property 
must be returned to the trust—they cannot be consumed; therefore they must remain inevitably 
available to the presumed spendthrift. 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50. 
 79. See Schenkel, supra note 11, at 183 (explaining how “there are occasions when an overly-
formalistic application of the title-split fiction also allows the trust to be used to skirt important 
obligations attached to property interests, causing negative ramifications to unrelated third 
parties.”). 
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restriction on alienation, even though limited to the interest of the 
beneficiary, can, as an independent matter, be justified as an exception to 
the rules of economic convention.  A beneficial interest in property, 
however one labels or describes it, is a type of property interest.80  It has 
value to the beneficiary and has presumptive value to the beneficiary’s 
creditor.  It is better to proceed then, by asking why restrictions on 
alienation are suspect and then whether the given reasons are applicable 
where the beneficial trust interest is concerned. 
Restrictions on alienation are derided because they blunt individual 
autonomy and, in the view of economic orthodoxy, prevent property 
from moving to higher value uses.81  Nonetheless, they are argued to be 
justified in certain situations either for economic efficiency purposes or 
for other normative reasons, such as distributional considerations.  
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed offer a number of possible 
justifications.  Among them are curbing “significant externalities”,82 
dealing with externalities that are not susceptible to collective 
measurement such as “moralisms”,83 paternalism,84 and achieving 
distributional goals.85  Others have offered some more recent treatment 
of inalienability rules.86  A closer look at the circumstances giving rise to 
justifications for inalienability rules reveals a few worth examining here. 
1. Preventing Externalities 
Suppose that Owner wishes to sell land to Polluter, who would 
engage in polluting activities, lowering the value of nearby land owned 
by others.  Although those others could pay Owner not to sell to Polluter 
(the Coasian solution), the large number of harmed landowners means 
that significant information costs and freeloader problems would arise.  
A modified inalienability rule, prohibiting the selling of land to a 
 
 80. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 57, at 1519 (taking the position that there are two theories of 
property; substance—a “bundle of sticks” or a “collection of substantive rights”; and form—there 
are a “limited” number of ways that the “sticks” or “rights” can be “bundled together.”).  The term 
“property interest” is just a label and what is important is whether the beneficiary has rights in the 
property.  Id.  
 81. See Epstein, supra note 73, at 971-72; Radin, supra note 73, at 1889-90.  Certainly we can 
agree that restricting the alienability of the beneficial trust interest prevents that beneficial trust 
interest from moving to a higher value use and also impedes the autonomy of the beneficiary.  
 82. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1111. 
 83. Id. at 1111-12. 
 84. Id. at 1113. 
 85. Id. at 1114. 
 86. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 73, at 931-32; Epstein, supra note 73, at 970; 
Fennell, supra note 73, at 1406. 
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polluter, would prevent this.  If avoiding pollution is cheaper than 
paying its costs, then such a rule would impose an efficient solution 
where costless bargaining is not possible.87  Inalienability rules can also 
be justified where necessary to control externalities manifesting as 
physical harms to non-owners or to those in common ownership of a 
resource.88  Thus, because the use of improper force can be a concern, 
we restrict the trafficking of guns, drugs, and even speech.89 
It is difficult to conceive of an externality that is avoided by 
restricting the alienability of trust interests.  But perhaps related is the 
assertion made by Hirsch90 that spendthrift trusts can actually benefit 
those outside the trust deal—in other words, that spendthrift trusts create 
positive externalities.91  Some contend that giving persons (potential 
settlors) great latitude in giving away their property serves the public 
interest.92  In this way, they reason, people will have incentive both to 
produce and save wealth.  This contention is in accord with the argument 
that estate taxes stifle incentives.93  That argument has its adherents, but 
has also been refuted using the same data set with which it was made.94  
 
 87. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1111.  The solution would be Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient.  Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or wealth maximization, sets forth that:  “A legal change is 
efficiency-enhancing if the gains to the winners exceed the losses to the losers or, alternatively 
stated if the wealth of society (as measured by willingness to pay) is increased.”  MERCURO & 
MEDEMA, supra note 18, at 105. 
 88. Epstein, supra note 73, at 973. 
 89. Id. at 974-78.  Epstein also discusses the consumption of liquor in his analysis of 
controlling social harms.  “Drinking liquor may not harm anyone but the user.  But the behavior that 
alcohol induces in drinkers may inflict serious harm upon third persons.”  Id. at 976.  
 90. Hirsch’s article takes an economic and “cognitive” approach to the spendthrift trust.  See 
Hirsch, supra note 54, at 7.  He notes that, up to the time of his writing, no one had applied a law 
and economics analysis to the spendthrift trust, including Richard Posner in his exclusive legal 
treatise on law and economics.  Id.  Posner has now included a section on the devices, and has duly 
cited Professor Hirsch in the chapter endnotes.  POSNER, supra note 17, at 548-51.  Indeed, while 
the spendthrift trust initially caused quite a negative reaction by at least one prominent legal 
academic (see infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text), recent critics have limited their 
suggestions to either enlarging the classes of creditors excepted from the trusts or to putting limits 
on its protection.  See Emanuel, supra note 36, at 208 (proposing to limit spendthrift protection to 
two-thirds of any distributions from a trust); Vitollo, supra note 36, at 178-79, 194-95 (proposing to 
allow involuntary tort creditors to obtain court orders that attach to any distribution from the 
tortfeasor’s spendthrift trust made by a trustee, but not to allow them to reach an undistributed 
interest in the trust). 
 91. Hirsch, supra note 54, at 11. 
 92. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1992) (discussing this proposition and noting both supporting and dissenting 
views). 
 93. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Death Tax: Investments, Employment, and Entrepreneurs, 84 
TAX NOTES 782 (1999).  
 94. James R. Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate Tax, 84 TAX NOTES 1541 (1999). 
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As applied to the spendthrift trust, it would assume that the 
entrepreneur’s desire to create the trust was in mind at the time his 
decision to engage in investment in an enterprise occurred, and that the 
creation of the trust would in fact follow that investment closely in time.  
But until the trust is created, any gains are free to be enjoyed by the 
entrepreneur, and most spendthrift trusts are created at the death of the 
donor, while the bulk of a person’s economic activity occurs well in 
advance of such time. Second, the argument would assume that the 
investor is convinced that the spendthrift attributes of the trust are 
essential to the preservation for the donee of any assets being given 
away.  Finally, production of goods and services responds to demands 
for those goods and services.  Reasonable restrictions on the 
businessperson’s ability to transform the nature of a gifted asset are 
unlikely to affect this rule.95 
2. Mitigation of Common Pool Problems 
Where common ownership is evident, such as in the classic 
common pool situation, each owner has incentive to take benefits from 
the pool, leaving the costs behind.96  If benefits taken from the pool 
cannot be alienated, then incentives to take larger quantities (and thus 
leave larger costs behind) are reduced.  So, water rights are sometimes 
restricted both as to use and alienation, as are fishing and hunting rights.  
With respect to alienation, the theory is that sale by a common pool 
member to a buyer, who may make more “intensive use” of common 
 
 95. See Joel C. Dobris, Federal Transfer Taxes: The Possibility of Repeal and the Post Repeal 
World, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 709, 714 n.37 (2000).  Indeed, this seems a case where what might be 
plausible in theory is so ludicrous in fact as to be laughable.  I simply cannot imagine that the 
inability to create a spendthrift trust could possibly have any effect on the donor’s incentive to 
amass wealth; in other words, I do not see two old duffers sitting around the country club talking 
about how they would go out and make more money were it not for their inability to create 
spendthrift trusts.  
 96. Epstein, supra note 73, at 978.  The classic common pool problem arises in a situation like 
marine fisheries; the problem arises in many other contexts as well.  Cf., e.g., Omer Kimhi, Reviving 
Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 644 (2008) (pointing 
out that when various interest groups participate in the municipal budgeting process, “each fragment 
fully enjoys the benefits of its own (successful) budgetary demands, but shares the costs of those 
demands with all other residents”); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on the Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 105, 112 (1984) (positing the 
so-called Creditors’ Bargain Theory of financially distressed firms; when a firm is on the verge of 
bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors have incentive to overuse the pool of assets to everyone’s 
detriment). 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/2
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
2012] EXPOSING THE HOCUS POCUS OF TRUSTS 85 
pool rights, can aggravate the common pool problem.97  A related 
situation is where parties share resources through some sort of 
contractual arrangement; to allow one of the parties to alienate his 
interest would create additional burdens for the others.98 
Anti-alienation features of the spendthrift trust do not respond to a 
common pool problem.  To the contrary, prohibiting alienability of the 
beneficial trust interest and thereby electing to externalize costs actually 
creates a common pool problem.99  Spendthrift trusts cause creditors in 
general to face greater information costs100 when extending credit; they 
now must determine whether a given debtor benefits from an interest in 
a spendthrift trust, which means that such property is not available to 
satisfy debts.  Indeed, all externalities created by spendthrift trusts 
represent increased costs to the common pool.  Further, because the 
benefits of the spendthrift trust are available only to those who are 
donees of persons with a certain minimum value in passive income-
producing assets to give away,101 exploitation of the pool is available 
only to a select few.  Others (the vast majority of people) are left to share 
the costs though they will never be able to enjoy the benefits. 
3. Dealing with Moralisms 
“Moralism” is a term first used in this context by Calabresi and 
Melamed.102  They define a moralism as a preference based on “religious 
 
 97. Epstein, supra note 73, at 981.  Here is where things can get interesting, as trusts, to the 
extent they externalize costs, also can create common pool problems.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 98. Epstein, supra note 73, at 982, 984 (“The same analysis can be extended to the sale of 
voting rights, which is generally restricted or prohibited. . . . Corporate charters often place 
consensual restrictions upon the alienation of shares.”). 
 99. Schenkel, supra note 11, at 209-11. 
 100. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 31-33 (2000).  Though Merrill and 
Smith contend that trusts do not create a common-pool problem, that conclusion is based solely on 
the formalistic application of the title-split fiction.  Id. at 34 n.130.  The error of relying on the title-
split is pointed out in Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 181, 210-11 (2009). 
 101. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, spendthrift trusts are only available as third-party 
trusts, and not as self-settled trusts.  Most jurisdictions expressly prohibit self-settled spendthrift 
trusts.  JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2009 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 9-43 to -61 
(2008).  Although exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I would note that 
permitting self-settled asset protection trusts is no solution to this issue.  Although self-settled 
spendthrift trusts dispense of the class issue created by allowing inherited wealth to be treated 
superior to earned wealth, they still require the settlor to be in possession of a significant value in 
income-producing assets. 
 102. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1111-12. 
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or transcendental reasons.”103  Moralisms do not lend themselves to 
monetization, which presents a problem for Coasian bargaining.104  To 
use one of Calabresi and Melamed’s examples, if T is allowed to sell 
himself into slavery and M is made unhappy by knowing slavery exists, 
then M is harmed by T’s actions.  Although the State could require the 
slave owner to pay the cost to M of his unhappiness, because this cost 
could not really be objectively measured, any liability rule would be 
unsatisfactory.105 
Hirsch takes the position that, were it not for the mitigating effect 
of the welfare state, Calabresi and Melamed’s moralisms would justify 
spendthrift trusts because “external costs arise simply from the 
displeasure persons experience when they see paupers, and inalienability 
rules that preclude individuals from falling into pauperism can function 
to control those costs.”106  Granted, there may be those who recoil at the 
thought of having their view sullied by images of the unwashed.  
Nonetheless, there are a few problems with Hirsch’s perspective.  First, 
it makes the dubious assumption that the only obstacle between the 
spendthrift trust beneficiary and certain destitution is the spendthrift 
trust.  It seems unlikely that more than a miniscule percentage of those 
persons in the socioeconomic class of the typical spendthrift trust 
beneficiary, denied the benefit of a spendthrift trust, would slip into 
anything resembling destitution.  Second, it has been argued that 
moralisms, essentially “adverse psychological reaction[s] to a state of 
affairs[,]”107 are less about economic efficiency and rather more about 
political points of view.108  Third, and most importantly, there are a 
number of other moral perspectives that would reach the conclusion 
opposite to that drawn by Hirsch.  For example, consider the moralism 
described as the displeasure one suffers from seeing a wealthy 
spendthrift’s welfare being protected by a privileged property interest 
containing enhanced features (the spendthrift attributes) that are 
unavailable to the public at large.  Should this moralism not be given 
equal weight to that of the sensitive soul with an aversion to the sight of 
paupers?  The list of moralisms could go on.  In short, the search for 
 
 103. Id. at 1102 n.30.  
 104. Id. at 1112. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Hirsch, supra note 54, at 12 n.39. 
 107. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 398 (1980). 
 108. See id. at 392. 
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moralisms that justify an economic position, while almost certain to turn 
up a handful, is not very helpful. 
4. Paternalism 
Spendthrift trusts are in most cases paternalistic.109  The settlor 
determines that the beneficiary would be better off not being able to 
bargain away his beneficial trust interest because the settlor knows better 
than the beneficiary what is best for the beneficiary.  If we assume the 
settlor is right, then restricting the disposition would arguably be 
economically efficient.  On the other hand, this paternalistic behavior 
flies in the face of Coasian bargaining and Pareto efficiency.110 
As it happens, the merits and demerits of paternalism have been 
argued in the context of spendthrift trusts.  Indeed, the most prominent 
nineteenth-century opponent of the spendthrift trust, Professor John 
Chipman Gray, maintained that the devices devalued liberty and 
protected “the weaker [] portion of the community.”111  This, according 
to Gray, is “paternalism, which is the fundamental essence alike of 
spendthrift trusts and of socialism.”112  Gray’s objection, which seems 
almost quaint today, has two features.  The first concerns the 
relationship between the settlor and the beneficiary.  Gray is saying that 
to coddle the beneficiary so is to restrict his autonomy—an evil unto 
itself.  This may be so, but it is not of interest in this paper’s analysis.113  
The other component of his objection implicates outsiders to the trust.  
For example, Hirsch criticizes Gray’s statement with an assertion that 
spendthrift trusts preserve the liberty of settlors to dispose of their 
property as they wish.114  Indeed, this is perhaps the most common 
 
 109. They would not always be paternalistic because at times a beneficiary will actually 
request that a trust be made spendthrift to take advantage of the creditor-protection features, 
particularly as a shield against tort creditors. 
 110. The Coase theorem assumes that “if rights are fully specified and transaction costs are 
zero, parties to a dispute will bargain to an efficient and invariant outcome regardless of the initial 
specification of rights.”  MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 18, at 110.  Under the principle of 
Pareto efficiency “a course of action is efficiency-enhancing if at least one person can be made 
better off without making anyone else worse off.”  Id. at 105.  See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 23, at 1114 (“[P]aternalism . . . is not consistent with the premises of Pareto optimality:  the 
most efficient pie is no longer that which costless bargains would achieve, because a person may be 
better off if he is prohibited from bargaining.”). 
 111. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at ix (2d ed. 
1895). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See infra note 41. 
 114. Hirsch, supra note 54, at 49-50. 
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defense given for the spendthrift trust.  But, it understates the legal 
dynamics of the device. 
Settlors are being given, by the spendthrift trust, a method of 
enhancing the property given away by restricting the legal interests of 
outsiders.  The law is, through the device, embellishing the property 
interest and making it more valuable.  While the property interest was in 
the settlor’s hands, it had a certain measurable benefit to the settlor.  Let 
us value that benefit at value “x.”  But it also had certain burdens 
attached, among them that it was exposed to the claims of the settlor’s 
creditors.  This would reduce its value to, say, “x-y.”  By giving it away 
in a spendthrift trust, the benefits hold at x, but the reduction by -y no 
longer pertains.  And regardless of notions of testamentary or donative 
freedom, no legal justification has been offered for providing enhanced 
benefits to one’s donees at the expense of outsiders.  So we are not 
balancing a policy in favor of freedom of the donor to dispose of his 
property as he wishes against the freedom of the beneficiary to do with 
his property as he wishes.  On the donor’s end of the scale is the right to 
give away more than he has by offloading some of the costs of 
ownership to third parties.  The donor’s rights are artificially enhanced.  
Hirsch says, “one way or the other, someone [either the donor or the 
donee] has to lose a portion of her liberty.”115  But freedom to give 
should be restricted to the freedom to give what one has; the law has no 
obligation to, and indeed should not, provide the donee with more than 
that possessed by the donor.116  
5. Achieving Distributional Goals 
One of the central insights of Calabresi and Melamed’s article is in 
the effect of inalienability on distributional goals.  They warn us that 
advocates for an inalienability rule may cite a reason such as paternalism 
for the rule as a foil.  The real reason for the rule may instead be to gain 
distributional benefits for a group for whom those benefits are not 
 
 115. Id. at 50. 
 116. Hirsch also says that settlors are giving beneficiaries enhanced worth because an annuity 
for life is a hedge against risk.  Id. at 58.  But this is not the type of enhancement I am referring to 
here.  The type of enhancement to which Hirsch refers does not create externalities.  The one to 
which I am referring does and is therefore objectionable.  Hirsch also attacks Gray for his hard-
heartedness in criticizing the settlor who wishes to provide for his beneficiary in this paternalistic 
manner.  Id. at 50.  But again, justifying paternalism is not the same thing as justifying legal 
enhancements to the property of the pater familias as part of the transferring process. 
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justified.117  That the distributional benefits of the spendthrift trust are an 
important part of their enabling has long been recognized by 
observers.118  And as Calabresi and Melamed point out, any time an 
inalienability rule is in place, “regardless of the reason for [the rule,] a 
group did gain from the prohibition.”119  They go on to say that “this 
should suffice to put us on guard, for it suggests that direct distributional 
motives may lie behind asserted nondistributional grounds for 
inalienability,” whatever they may be.120 
As pointed out above, the spendthrift trust is argued to be justified 
on the basis of paternalism and as a simple manifestation of a property 
owner’s power to dispose of property as the owner sees fit.  Nonetheless, 
its distributional effects are profound.  Prohibiting the voluntary 
alienation of the beneficial trust interest eliminates all risk that the 
benefits of the interest will be dissipated through normal market 
transactions conducted by the beneficiary.  The trust beneficiary may not 
sell, give away, or encumber the beneficial trust interest.  Prohibiting 
involuntary alienation makes the defaulting trust beneficiary richer and 
the creditor poorer.  It makes poorer those who must pay more for credit 
in the marketplace because some debtors are protected by spendthrift 
trusts.  It makes the tort victim with a judgment against the spendthrift 
trust beneficiary poorer.  It increases the cost of insurance against torts 
for other potential tortfeasors.  
Does the restriction on involuntary alienation in a spendthrift trust 
provide corresponding benefits to the public?  Hirsch cites to courts that 
state that it keeps the beneficiary from becoming a “public charge.”121  
This point seems robust at first glance but withers under close analysis.  
First, as already noted,122 we should be able to acknowledge that slipping 
onto the welfare rolls is not going to be a big risk for those in the 
socioeconomic class of the typical spendthrift trust beneficiary.  Second, 
the beneficiary’s welfare-eligibility turns on whether the government is 
 
 117. “The danger may be . . . that what is justified on, for example, paternalism ground is really 
a hidden way of accruing distributional benefits for a group whom we would not otherwise wish to 
benefit.”  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1115. 
 118. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynamic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 572 (1964) 
(“Validation of the spendthrift trust was primarily a response to the spread of the dynastic trust. The 
dynastic trust . . . must be . . . secure from destruction at the hands of particular beneficiaries and 
this need has been met by the spendthrift trust.”); Emanuel, supra note 36, at 190 (“I would submit 
that the very interests which must invalidate restraints in order to thrive suddenly find that this 
particular restraint suits their personal interests quite nicely.”). 
 119. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1114. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Hirsch, supra note 54, at 11. 
 122. See supra note 106. 
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entitled to count the trust property as being owned by the beneficiary.123  
Trusts prepared for Medicaid recipients, for example, are intended to 
preserve rather than prevent the beneficiary’s place on the public dole.124  
These trusts are inevitably spendthrift—that is the whole point.125  
Finally, even in those cases where the beneficiary would be eligible for 
public support but for the trust, what is the corresponding cost to 
society?  The costs offloaded by the spendthrift trust are borne by others; 
they will resurface in the form of higher interest rates, tighter credit 
markets, or other responses to creditors’ losses. 
The welfare state is said to create “moral hazard” by providing a 
safety net for the idle, or indeed for the unrepentant spendthrift.126  
Hirsch says that spendthrift trusts prevent moral hazard because they 
obligate the trust beneficiary to conserve sufficient resources for his or 
her own support.127  But this conservation comes on the backs of those 
 
 123. Similar to Supplemental Security Income benefits, eligibility for Medicaid has an income 
test and a resources test.  42 U.S.C. § 1382(g)-(h) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 435.608(a) (2011) (“As a 
condition for eligibility, the agency must require applicants to take all necessary steps to obtain any 
annuities, pensions, retirement, and disability benefits to which they are entitled, unless they can 
show good cause for not doing so.”).  According to the Virginia Medicaid Manual, eligibility for 
Medicaid rests on non-financial factors, as well as financial considerations, including income and 
resources limitations.  VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, MEDICAID MANUAL, M06: 
Family and Child Resources - M07: Families and Children Income, available at 
http://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/division/bp/medical_assistance/manual_transmittals/manual/m06.
pdf (last visited June 15, 2010). 
 124. See Cohen v. Div. of Med. Assistance, 668 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (Mass. 1996); Zeoli v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Serv., 425 A.2d 553, 557-58 (Conn. 1979).  
 125. TAX, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY: FORMS AND PRACTICE § 
I:19[5] (2010) (stating “[t]he special needs or supplemental needs trust is a form of discretionary 
spendthrift trust designed to preserve the public assistance benefits of a disabled beneficiary.”); 
William L.E. Dussault, Planning for Disability, 33 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 42 (2007) 
(“[w]hether a testamentary or inter vivos SNT model is chosen, there are certain critical provisions 
that must be included within the trust language.  The trust must be a spendthrift trust.”). 
 126. “[A] ‘moral hazard’ is a ‘risk, danger, or probability that the insured will destroy . . . the 
insured property for the purpose of collecting the insurance.’”  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers 
Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381, 392 (Tenn. 2009) (internal citations omitted).  “The simplest 
example of [] a moral hazard is that applicable to fire insurance on property . . . the moral hazard is 
the risk or probability that the individual insured will destroy or permit to be destroyed the insured 
property for purpose of collecting insurance benefits.”  Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 611 
S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).  The Seventh Circuit described an extreme example of a 
moral hazard as “the temptation of an insured to precipitate the event insured against if the 
insurance goes beyond merely replacing a loss.”  Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. 
Co., 482 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2007).  A moral hazard is also defined as “a hazard that has its 
inception in mental attitudes.  Examples include dishonesty, carelessness, and insanity.  The risk 
that an insured will destroy property or allow it to be destroyed (usu. by burning) in order to collect 
the insurance proceeds is a moral hazard.  Also, an insured’s potential interest, if any, in the burning 
of the property is sometimes called a moral hazard.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 736 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 127. Hirsch, supra note 54, at 11-12. 
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who would have rights in the spendthrift’s property, along with other 
outsiders who indirectly share in those costs.  And what about the moral 
hazard created by the spendthrift trust?  The beneficiary can borrow and 
spend at will in the confidence that the trust corpus will remain, 
regardless of whether the beneficiary’s behavior engenders disgruntled 
and unpaid creditors.  Indeed, viewed from this perspective, the 
spendthrift trust could be described as a private welfare program for the 
carriage trade.  And, Hirsch is wrong to the extent he implies that the 
spendthrift trust beneficiary is ineligible in all instances for welfare 
programs.  Witness the Medicaid trust, as mentioned above,128 and also 
the so-called “special needs trust,” another spendthrift trust which exists 
solely to keep a trust beneficiary on the public dole.129  Further, the costs 
created by spendthrift trusts are not fully borne by the parties to the trust 
deal.130 
Externalities created by the spendthrift trust are attributable to the 
indebted beneficiary’s categorical immunity from the legally legitimate 
claims of creditors.  Creditors necessarily suffer, as do other participants 
in credit markets to whom these costs are passed, in the form of higher 
interest rates or other “tightening” of credit.131  Even those who do not 
participate in credit markets suffer because costs to creditors can be 
passed on to others by increasing the cost of goods and services or by 
other means.  For example, the Internal Revenue Code allows creditors 
to deduct losses from bad debts from taxable income, which of course 
 
 128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Harriet H. Onello, Planning for Incapacity, MASS. CONTINUING L. EDUC. § 14.5.7 
(2009) (describing how federal and state laws and regulations are important considerations in 
determining whether to set up a special needs trust for an incapacitated individual, as these 
particular trusts are intended to act as supplemental income and support to those individuals and not 
to interfere with the receipt of government funds and assistance); Jeffrey A. Bloom & Harry S. 
Margolis, Elder Law: Wills, Trusts and Basic Estate Planning Strategies, 56 MASS. PRAC., ELDER 
LAW § 11:31 (2009) (detailing how it may be beneficial to arrange a special needs trust as an 
irrevocable supplement trust, where third parties can contribute funds directly to the trust for the 
benefit of the special needs beneficiary, so as not to hinder the eligibility for government funds). 
 130. See infra Part III.C. 
 131. In a confounding part of his article, Hirsch asserts that the spendthrift trust efficiently 
avoids transaction costs between the beneficiary and the beneficiary’s creditors.  Hirsch, supra note 
54, at 59.  He arrives at this conclusion by stating first that if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust 
did not receive an interest immune from creditors’ claims, then the beneficiary could bargain with 
creditors for this right (he does not explain why a creditor would release a right to be paid for an 
amount less than that owed).  Id.  He admits that we do not know of instances where this has 
happened and offers that this is probably because of transaction costs.  Id.  Therefore, the spendthrift 
trust avoids transaction costs.  He also says that the trust benefits society in that it “impede[s] debtor 
destitution.”  Id.  Never mind that it does so selectively and with significant corresponding costs. 
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shifts a part of the loss to all.132  It is safe to assume that any and all 
creditors who are competently advised from a tax perspective will take 
advantage of this provision. 
C. Restrictions on Involuntary Alienation are Problematic 
Even if involuntary alienation can rightfully be restricted by a 
donor of property, to so restrict it is problematic.  Certain exceptions to 
the general rule of alienability of property have been justified due to 
transaction costs that prevent Cosean bargaining, to eliminate certain 
externalities and to achieve certain distributional goals.  What the 
exceptions mentioned above have in common is that restrictions on 
alienation relieve pressure on persons outside the transaction.133  None of 
these situations exist in the case of the beneficial trust interest, so it 
would not seem that the restriction on alienation would fit a settled 
exception.  In contrast, making a beneficial interest in a trust inalienable 
increases pressure on outsiders and relieves an insider, the beneficiary, 
of burdens associated with ownership.  Restricting the alienability of the 
beneficial trust interest prevents that interest from moving to a higher 
value use and impedes the autonomy of the beneficiary. 
But perhaps not all creditors are worthy of protection from the 
spendthrift trust.  As for the costs borne directly by the creditors 
themselves, Hirsch emphasizes that ordinary business creditors, being 
sophisticated in their business practices, should be aware of the 
existence of the spendthrift trust and adjust interest rates and other 
lending practices accordingly.134  His point that these creditors occupy 
no moral high ground is a good one—it is hard to conjure up sympathy 
 
 132. 26 U.S.C. § 166(a) (2000).  See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE 
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 50 (1973) (“The presence of tax expenditures in the income tax 
system has wide ranging and significant effects . . . [f]or some individuals, these tax expenditures 
mean that no income tax need be paid at all; for others, the tax paid will be nominal in comparison 
with the actual income received.”); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES 1, 5 (1985) (“The spending programs embedded in the Internal Revenue Code are 
termed ‘tax expenditures.’ . . . The classification of an item as a tax expenditures does not in itself 
make that item either a desirable or an undesirable provision . . . [it] is purely informative.”).  For a 
critical view, see Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155 
(1988). 
 133. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1111 (stating that inalienability rules 
may be justified where transactions would “create significant externalities.”).  Calabresi and 
Melamed also take the position that restrictions on alienability may be justified by what they call 
“moralisms”; a sense on the part of others that a certain type of transaction is morally wrong that 
“does not lend itself to an acceptable objective measurement . . .”  Id. at 1112.  These are of course, 
also a type of externality, albeit a discredited one.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 134. Hirsch, supra note 54, at 61. 
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for the bilked commercial lender who decries the spendthrift trust.135  
Further, modern technology makes it relatively easy for the sophisticated 
lender to access credit reports and other relevant information about 
potential debtors, reducing information costs. 
But Hirsch is on shakier ground when he completely dismisses the 
possibility that a potential creditor could fail to appreciate the debtor 
protection characteristics of the beneficiary’s property interest.136  
Though the corpus of the trust is in technical ownership of the trustee, 
there is no requirement that legal title be labeled as spendthrift, and 
particularly where the beneficiary is also the trustee, a creditor wishing 
to minimize the information costs associated with additional 
investigation could be easily fooled.  Note that many people now hold 
property interests in revocable living trusts, which would be impossible 
to distinguish from a spendthrift trust judging by the label alone:  “X, as 
trustee of the X trust.”  Indeed, a creditor might reasonably assume that a 
trust labeled as such was not spendthrift because most jurisdictions don’t 
allow a self-settled spendthrift trust.137  But a spendthrift trust created by 
S for X, as beneficiary, could also name X as trustee—title would look 
the same. 
Nonetheless, except to the extent it passes on costs to others,138 it 
may be that the spendthrift trust would be unobjectionable as against 
voluntary creditors who know or should know about the trust.  
Voluntary business creditors are generally sophisticated enough to make 
sure their rights are protected by getting a security interest or 
discounting the value of the spendthrift trust in making decisions about 
whether or not to lend.  And if not, then perhaps they should bear the 
cost.  Even so, there is an externality to the public here because the cost 
of credit or goods and services to others is raised to pay for the 
profligacy of the spendthrift trust beneficiary.  In other words, the 
creditor will offload this cost onto the public who can pay if the 
spendthrift trust beneficiary will not.139 
 
 135. Hirsch even suggests that lenders might be morally culpable in these situations for their 
careless or aggressive practices.  Id. 
 136. Id. at 63-65. 
 137. Most jurisdictions expressly prohibit self-settled spendthrift trusts.  SCHOENBLUM, supra 
note 31, at 9-43 to -61. 
 138. There will always be an externality to others here because the cost of credit (and/or other 
goods and services) to others is raised to pay for the profligacy of the spendthrift trust beneficiary.  
Costs passed on may be significant. 
 139. Even Hirsch points out that creditors may actually “pool risk among [all] debtors, 
offering” the same rate—this is a way to bypass the information costs that custom credit 
arrangements would entail.  Hirsch, supra note 54, at 67.  Hirsch says that because credit markets 
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In practice, however, perhaps the dominant motivating value of the 
spendthrift trust as an estate planning tool is in its use as a foil to the 
involuntary (such as tort) creditor.140  For obvious reasons, this category 
of creditors cannot be said to get what it deserves when blocked from 
satisfying claims by spendthrift trust provisions.  Hirsch does concede 
that it could be economically efficient for the spendthrift trust property 
to be available to the creditor in such a case because it could prevent 
such persons from having to rely on state support and it could also serve 
as a disincentive to beneficiaries to take on involuntary creditors.141  In 
sum, there is little question that the spendthrift trust imposes significant 
costs on outsiders.  The next section of the article explores why this 
situation has been allowed to persist. 
 
are often rate-pooled the spendthrift trust will externalize some costs to other debtors, who will end 
up paying higher rates because of the existence of spendthrift trusts.  Id. at 67-68.  He offers that 
because spendthrift trust beneficiaries are generally drawn from the wealthier classes this is a wealth 
transfer from the rich to the poor.  Id. at 68.  But he concludes that this transfer is “efficient” because 
most defaulting creditors are from the poorer classes and therefore rate-pooling already amounts to 
exploitation of the wealthy by the poor.  Id.  But Hirsch’s assumptions about the relative affluence 
of defaulting debtors cannot be accepted as a given; indeed, the opposite may be true.  David 
Streitfeld, Biggest Defaulters on Mortgages Are the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/business/economy/09rich.html?_r=1&src=me&ref=general.%
E2%80%9D.  He then surmises that if spendthrift trusts did not exist, then donors would simply 
give money to a family member along with precatory instructions to use it to care for the 
beneficiary.  Hirsch, supra note 54, at 70.  But I cannot imagine that such an arrangement would 
ever become commonplace.  Because it would create no legal obligation on the part of the donee to 
care for the spendthrift, a lawyer would have to consider whether the client’s intended third part 
beneficiary (the object of the client’s precatory bounty) would have a potential cause of action 
against the lawyer when the donee fails to carry out the donor’s instructions. 
 140. A simple internet search will reveal that trusts are heavily marketed to those seeking 
protection from malpractice and other tort claims. 
 141. Id. at 78-79.  If they are involuntary, I do not see how incentives would work here.  
Perhaps it will prevent the beneficiary from engaging in risky behaviors that would otherwise attract 
tort claims for negligence.  Hirsch also points out that the spendthrift trust may be the best party to 
take on involuntary liability.  Id. at 79.  Hirsch also holds forth on whether spendthrift trusts should 
be subject to tax claims, claims for emergency medical care, and what he calls “unsophisticated 
trade creditors.”  Id. at 82. He concludes that he would generally allow spendthrift trusts while 
creating certain narrowly-tailored exceptions.  Id. at 82-83. 
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IV.  WHY THE ILLUSION PERSISTS 
A. The Constraining Influence of Our Property Model 
1. The Property Rights Baseline 
It has long been a tenet of testamentary transfer law that the 
intention of the testator should be given the highest regard.142  Closely 
related, and also presumed, is the idea that the donative transferor should 
be able to place reasonable restrictions and conditions upon any 
beneficial interests bestowed upon the objects of the transferor’s 
bounty.143  Our ready acceptance of these principles seems to be 
informed by a view of property that takes negative liberty as its 
baseline.144  Under this theory, owners’ rights over their property, 
including the right to exclude others, the right of alienation, and other 
rights in the bundle, should be free from the interference of third-parties, 
including that of the government on behalf of itself or others.145 
 
 142. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 293 (“the process of construction ‘is primarily 
concerned with giving effect to the testator’s disposition in an instance in which his intention is 
unclear or unexpressed.’”) (citing GOODRICH AND SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 168 (4th ed. 
1964)); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2) (amended 2008) (stating that one of the underlying 
purposes and policies of the Uniform Probate Code is “to discover and make effective the intent of a 
decedent in distribution of his property.”); Id. § 2-805 (allowing a court to reform terms of a 
governing instrument “to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that the transferor’s intent and the terms of the governing instrument were 
affected by a mistake of fact or law.”).  See also Bostwick v. Hurstel, 304 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Mass. 
1973) (describing how it is “the unquestioned rule of construction . . . is to give effect to the 
testator’s intent where possible”); Daly v. Gaskins, 133 N.E. 886, 886 (Mass. 1922) (explaining 
how “it is the duty of the court to ascertain the intent of the testator from all the words in the will 
and then to give effect to that intent.”); Wait v. Belding, 41 Mass. 129, 133, 136 (1837) (stating that 
the purpose of the “law [is to] give effect to” the intention of the testator and that the “question [of 
interpreting the will] turns on the intent of the testator.”). 
 143. See, e.g., McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465, 467 (Iowa 1915) (“the donor or testator may 
impose such conditions to his gift or devise as he may elect.”); Cochenour v. Cochenour, 642 
S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“a donor has the right to place restrictions or conditions on 
a gift.”); Cooper v. Smith, 800 N.E.2d 372, 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (“a donor may impose 
conditions on a gift so that if the condition fails, the gift also fails.”); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 9 S.C.Eq. 
(Rich. Cas.) 36, 44 (1831) (“a donor has the right to impose such limitations and restrictions on 
his gift as he may think proper.”).  See also Duncan E. Osborne, Asset Protection: Trust Planning, 
A.L.I. 1 (2009) (“Spendthrift provisions are respected as being within the power of a 
donor to place conditions on any potential gifts.”). 
 144. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 143 (2000) 
(“Negative liberty means ‘absence of external social constraint on what one does,’ while one who 
has positive liberty, on the other hand, possesses the means and the ability to engage in ‘rational 
self-direction or self-government.’”). 
 145. Id. at 3. 
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For this reason, any person who wishes to impose on the rights of 
an owner carries a heavy burden in justifying this imposition.  Our 
conception of ownership presumes, then, that a property owner has 
complete freedom of disposition of owned property interests, including 
the freedom to structure that disposition.  Under this paradigm, trusts 
that externalize costs could be justified as carrying out the settlor’s 
absolute right of disposition, regardless of their effects on outsiders.146  
The ownership presumption pushes our analysis in the direction of 
furthering the transferor’s intent.  Failing to carry out the settlor’s intent 
impinges on the settlor-as-owner’s negative liberty—the foundation of 
the owner’s property rights. 
But if we consider the question of a spendthrift trust and the rights 
of a beneficiary’s creditor, for example, this analysis ignores that there 
are two persons with legal interests here; just as having the right to 
dispose of one’s property as one chooses is a legal right, so is the 
contingent right to proceed against the property of a person whose 
negligence causes one harm who defaults on a debt.  The creditor’s right 
cannot be dismissed by simply referencing the property rights of 
another.  And yet we tend to conceive of rights surrounding 
“ownership,” such as the right to alienate, as absolutes, not at all 
contingent in their scope on how they affect the rights (even the property 
rights) of others.  Where many other rights are concerned, we don’t take 
such an unrelenting view.  Yet, it has been argued that this “common 
conception” of property conflicts with the “operative conception” (what 
is actually applied by the courts) in that one’s property rights are not 
always given stringent protection.147  Laura Underkuffler looks at what 
happens when property rights conflict with public interests, as developed 
in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court.148  Generally, the Court adopts a common conception 
distinguished by its negative liberty interests.149  These interests are 
 
 146. Eckels v. Davis, 111 S.W.3d 687, 694 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (detailing how it is a rule of 
construction that the intent of the settlor or “maker” of the trust controls); L’Argent v. Barnett Bank, 
N.A., 730 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“The polestar of trust interpretation is the 
settlors’ intent.”). 
 147. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 5-6 
(2003). 
 148. Id. at 38. 
 149. “This familiar conception of property, when combined with Takings Clause protection, 
has very concrete meaning.  It means the protection of possessions; it means the protection of one’s 
business; it means the protection of expectations of development of one’s land.  The ‘right to 
property,’ under this conception, is of a very definite character; it is envisioned as a box, with all 
objects or interests within that box protected strongly and equally.”  Id. at 39.  Underkuffler cites 
several Supreme Court opinions in support of this statement, including Prune Yard Shopping Center 
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assumed to be protected with great stringency,150 to be “overidden 
(without legal consequence) only by public interests of a particularly 
dire or compelling nature, but only by interests of that nature.”151  In 
reality however, says Underkuffler, the Court tends to apply an 
“operative” conception of property that embodies change as part of its 
nature.152  Thus, when property interests are in conflict with “ordinary or 
routine goals of government,” the regulations are often upheld as 
regulation, rather than takings of the property.153  So, the common 
conception is at odds with the actual application. 
Yet the way we think about property is a problem because it falls 
short as a way of describing the nature of property.154  The perception of 
property owners as to the parameters of their ownership contributes to 
conflicts when reality does not square with their perception.155  Recent 
research on “cognitive framing”—the manner in which information is 
presented—shows that “the same property entitlement . . . presented two 
different ways, may produce sharply divergent outcomes” because it 
affects the attitudes and expectations of those who are subject to the 
relevant rules.156  The framing of the concept determines expectations 
and influences of both laypeople and political elites.157  Though the 
bundle of sticks analysis associated with Hohfeld158 and embraced by the 
legal realists is a conceptual step away from the ownership model, at 
least one commentator questions whether legal realists have really shed 
the ownership model’s yoke.159  Our cultural understanding of 
ownership informs our assumptions—even though we think the bundle 
of rights model predominates.  Another problem with the bundle of 
rights model is that it ignores that property rules not only describe but 
 
v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
Id.  
 150. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 147, at 40. 
 151. Id. at 45. 
 152. Id. at 46. 
 153. Id. 
 154. SINGER, supra note 144, at 6. 
 155. Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 
451-52 (2010).  
 156. Id. at 452. 
 157. Id. at 465. 
 158. SINGER, supra note 144, at 6. 
 159. Though the bundle of sticks model has predominated property conception in the legal 
academy, it is not without its critics.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357-59 (2001); Eric R. Claeys, 
Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 Seattle U. L. Rev. 617, 617-18 (2009) 
(reviewing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007)); 
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1188-93 (1999). 
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also help form human interactions; property rules are, in part, about 
social relations.  This view, which some have labeled an “expressive” 
theory of law,160 overlaps with cognitive framing and provides that legal 
actions express meaning and inform our perspectives and actions.161 
The ownership model is responsible, according to Joseph Singer, 
for encouraging property owners to ignore the rights and needs of others 
because the presumption is that “ownership and obligation are opposites, 
as are property and regulation.”162  But private property depends on 
regulation for its very existence; indeed, “private property itself is a form 
of regulation,” one that “requires a working legal system that can define, 
allocate, and enforce property rights.”163  Singer reminds us that “a legal 
system that protects property rights is not the state of nature,”164 and here 
a reconsideration of Harold Demsetz’s conjecture about why private 
property rights were developed yields additional insight into the 
regulatory basis of private property.165 
2. Private Property as a Regulatory Scheme for the Allocation of 
Resources 
When resources were available to all rather than allocated to 
specific owners, social costs associated with resource exploitation were 
largely externalized—the common pool problem.  Even though every 
user bore a small percentage of those costs, there were no incentives for 
any particular user to reduce them because any and all other users could 
free-ride.  The costs of bargaining, especially compared with any 
particular individual’s share of the externalized costs, were prohibitively 
high before a private property system emerged.  Demsetz explained how 
communal property arrangements can, at times, result in unacceptable 
externalities.166  Private property, for Demsetz, was a way of 
 
 160. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2047 (1996). 
 161. Baron, supra note 69, at 212.  
 162. SINGER, supra note 144, at 6.  
 163. Id. at 8.  
 164. Id. at 68. 
 165. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351-52 
(1967), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~kfandl/Demsetz_Property_Rights.pdf (explaining a 
study performed by Eleanor Leacock, who “established the fact that a close relationship existed, 
both historically and geographically, between the development of private rights in land and the 
development of the commercial fur trade” in her study of the Montagnes). 
 166. Id. at 351-52.  Scholars have recognized Demsetz’s paper as “the ‘point of departure for 
virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights’ since its publications some forty years 
ago.”  James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
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internalizing the social costs created by open communal access to 
valuable resources.  In Demsetz’s example, a study of the fur trade 
among the indigenous population of the Labrador Peninsula revealed 
that when the value of furs rose, hunting increased, resulting in a 
reduction in game.167  As this problem became critical, alternative 
arrangements were made, including the restricting of certain population 
segments to certain hunting territories, as well as seasonal restrictions.168  
For Demsetz, this was evidence that private property rights evolved 
because they produce efficiency gains.169  Whether Demsetz had it right 
or not regarding the evolution of private property,170 his point about the 
usefulness of crafting legal rights in ways that internalize costs is 
indisputable.  
But, we can take a second look at Demsetz’s theory about the 
evolution of private property and describe it another way.  Demsetz said 
that private property rights internalized the costs of overhunting; after 
private property rights were implemented, the costs were imposed solely 
on those who had control over the use of the land.171  But suppose 
private property rights were not implemented.  There is another way the 
problem of overhunting could have been resolved.  All of the hunters 
could have gotten together and agreed on how much game each could 
take from the land so that enough would remain for everyone.  But, 
transaction costs would be far too high for this to occur.  Instead, the 
private property rights solution was imposed.  By imposing private 
property rights, transaction costs were eliminated because the need—
indeed the opportunity—for any transaction to take place was eliminated 
by revoking the hunting rights to any particular piece of land of most of 
the population.  Freedom to hunt was restricted so that transactions, 
which when all hunters had to agree were too costly to undertake, were 
eliminated.  The hunters could not eliminate the costs of everyone 
hunting the land, so they took away or substantially restricted the rights 
 
139, 139 (2009) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution 
of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002)). 
 167. Demsetz, supra note 165, at 350-51. 
 168. Id. at 352. 
 169. Id. at 352-53. 
 170. Others have competing theories.  See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Evolution of Property 
Rights: A Synthetic Overview (U. MICH. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 08-021, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1284424.  Demsetz has maintained 
that his article was focused only on the “why” and not the “how” of private property evolution.  
Krier, supra note 166, at 143. 
 171. Demsetz, supra note 165, at 356. 
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of most.  They externalized the cost of bargaining by externalizing the 
potential bargainers. 
So one way of describing why private property rights worked in 
Demsetz’s example is to say that they abolished the property rights of 
most, consequently eliminating the need for negotiating with ousted 
parties.  Privatization of property rights reduces costs, in part, by 
reducing the number of parties with a stake in the system.  Remember 
that the Coase theorem works conceptually because we assume no 
transaction costs.  So, there is no reason why it would not work in a 
communal property situation.  If Blackacre is a communal hunting 
ground—“owned” by the community if you will—then everyone who 
benefits from hunting Blackacre also suffers from overhunting of 
Blackacre.  In other words, all costs are internalized among the 
communal owners of Blackacre.  If all of the communal owners could 
get together and negotiate, presumably they could collectively determine 
how much game each could take from Blackacre or how much each 
would have to pay the others for a stipulated amount of hunting rights.172  
Because everyone is a party to the same enterprise in a communal 
property situation, there are no external costs to internalize.  The 
problem is not externalities because no one is external to the enterprise.  
The problem is transaction costs.  There is no conceivable way that all 
parties could get together and negotiate a solution.  We create outsiders 
when we create a private property regime.  We create outsiders by 
revoking the rights of certain persons to benefit from the property.173 
Demsetz’s new system accomplished two things.  First, it ensured 
that costs of exploitation were borne to a much greater degree by a 
smaller group of individuals who did the exploiting.  Second, it reduced 
the number of parties necessary to participate in any bargaining 
regarding externalized costs.  It did this by implementing an enforced 
scheme under which geographic bundles of resources were allocated 
exclusively or semi-exclusively.  Viewed in this way, with or without 
the legal-economic gloss, the private property system could simply be 
described as an enforced regulatory regime for the allocation of 
 
 172. This assumes no free rider problem.  Free riders, or “free loaders” are explained as “those 
who would gain from a bargain but are unwilling to pay to bring it about.”  Guido Calabresi, 
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 
(1968). 
 173. Note that saying that the Coase theorem would work in communal property situations runs 
counter to Coase’s admonition that, in order for it to work, “property rights” must be clearly 
defined.  But I would take issue with this.  All that is necessary is for contracts to be enforceable.  
The assignment of property rights just gives the parties a starting point, a standard set of 
conditions—negotiating among rational parties can take place without it.  
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resources in a manner that minimizes social costs.  Particular individuals 
or groups were given rights to benefit from particular bundles of 
resources.  Those rights, including their exclusivity, were enforced.  The 
concept of “ownership” evolved as a shorthand way of describing the 
legal relationship of an individual participant to others in this scheme. 
Although the regulatory regime we think of as ownership includes 
many rights and privileges ensuring a negative liberty interest, those 
rights and privileges have always come with limits and obligations.  
Indeed, those rights and privileges arose because limits and obligations 
preserve property benefits.  Many of those limits and obligations exist 
because ownership rights are not absolute; they are inevitably in conflict 
with the interests of the collective as well as with the ownership interests 
of other property owners.  Clearly, the exercise of ownership rights has 
consequences.  One owner’s right to draw water from her property 
reaches its limits at some point when it affects the water supply of the 
adjoining property owner.  Legislative or judicial intervention is simply 
an ongoing refinement of the resource allocation that we call a private 
property regime.  One owner’s decision to build and operate a noisy 
night club next to another owner’s residence might diminish the value of 
the second owner’s residence.  So zoning laws, which restrict one 
property owner’s negative liberty interests, will often protect the 
negative liberty interests of others.174  These laws are not separate and 
apart from the private property regime but simply modern refinements; 
they are of a piece with any rules that describe how resources are shared 
and allocated.  Zoning laws, despite that they restrict negative liberty 
interests, are desirable because they generally help maintain or even 
enhance the value of property by reducing social costs of property use.  
Likewise, nondiscrimination laws that mandate equal access to goods 
and services in the marketplace ensure that all persons have the ability to 
acquire property. 
There is precedent for the proposition that the right of a deceased 
owner to disaggregate property bundles in disposing of his property 
interest as he wishes must be tempered by other important considerations 
in the private property regime.  Consider, for example, the history of the 
fee tail.  This estate, created by a conveyance “To A and the heirs of his 
body,” meant that A held the land for life, after which his eldest son 
would take, a process that continued on down the line.175  This state of 
 
 174. Of course, the negative liberty interest on the part of the residence owner is here being 
impinged upon by the private citizen who wishes to operate the nightclub, but that citizen’s power 
to impinge is drawn from the ownership interest the law gives him in his property. 
 175. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 323 (3d ed. 2010). 
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affairs brought on the familiar and considerable sacrifices to efficiency.  
Property could not move to its highest value use because any given 
owner could not alienate an interest in the land for a period greater than 
his life.176  Not only would this reduce marketability, any given owner 
had reduced incentive to improve the land.177  Eventually, the fee tail 
was abolished by statute in various jurisdictions of the United States.178  
The abolition of the fee tail, even though it dispossessed the rights of 
heirs, stands as proof that property rights were not seen as absolute but 
instead were subject to modification and even abolition for appropriate 
policy reasons.179 
B. Path-Dependence 
1. In General 
Given that framing matters, we must recognize the possibility that 
the model we use to describe ownership may be channeling our thinking 
in a way that colors our perception of the trust.  To justify the third-party 
costs of trusts as necessary manifestations of the settlor’s ownership 
rights is to ignore important aspects of the property picture.  But our 
laws are shaped by certain historical circumstances.  Formal legal 
models, especially when burnished by deductive and syllogistic legal 
gloss, can be powerfully constraining.  The combination can create a 
path from which it is virtually impossible to deviate.  We end up with a 
standard whose shortcomings are difficult to recognize in that the model 
itself is self-obscuring and politically entrenched.  And the path we 
chose that made sense in a prior environment may no longer make sense 
today.180 
 
 176. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential 
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 410 (2005).  Note that 
the argument is that temporal division and inalienability provisions in the trust do not present the 
same problems as the underlying property can still be alienated by the trustee.  See BOGERT ET AL., 
supra note 6, § 222.   
 177. For this and other efficiency problems, see Stake, supra note 176, at 410-15. 
 178. SINGER, supra note 175, at 323. 
 179. Even an archetypal libertarian thinker like James Madison recognized this.  See John F. 
Hart, “A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of the 
Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 188 (2001). 
 180. A number of legal scholars have written about how path-dependence shapes the law.  See, 
e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998); Oona 
A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603 (2001); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path 
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 642 (1996). 
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The evolutionary paradigm of law and economics holds that law, as 
a phenomenon subject to market forces, must be efficient in order to 
survive.181  Professor Mark Roe concedes the value of the evolutionary 
model in explaining developments in law but finds it wanting in any 
effort to explain, among other things, certain “politically and legally 
determined business institutions.”182  He brings in three embellishments 
to enhance its efficacy:  chaos theory, evolutionary theory, and path-
dependence.183  Chaos theory is as complicated as it sounds,184 but for 
Roe it can be summed up simply:  “The initial rule orders the 
microchanges we first observe, but twists and turns can ordain results far 
from those originally expected.”185  Roe’s second embellishment is 
really just an explanation of evolutionary theory, and one advanced to 
non-scientists primarily by the late anthropologist Stephen J. Gould.  
Gould explained that evolution is not necessarily a movement to more 
progressive or complex phenomena, but rather an adaptation to specific 
environmental incidents.186  What may be best suited for yesterday’s 
environment may not be best for today’s.  “But natural selection, by 
 
 181. Krier, supra note 170, at 145 (“There are at least two very different types of evolutionary 
accounts that might be used to explain the emergence of property rights.  One type views property 
as the product of intentional undertakings; property is ‘designed.’  The other type sees property as 
an unintended consequence of individual actions; property arises ‘spontaneously.’”); Owen D. 
Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 209 
(2001) (“[I]f better behavioral models can yield more effective legal tools, and if human behavior is 
influenced by evolutionary processes, then greater knowledge of how evolutionary processes 
influence behavior may improve law’s ability to regulate it.”). 
 182. Roe, supra note 180, at 642.  See generally Stake, supra note 176, at 401-02.  But see, 
e.g., Dagan, supra note 57, at 1529 (contending that the evolution of legal concepts is partially 
explained by their normative implications). 
 183. Roe, supra note 180, at 642-43.  Evolutionary theory actually takes all of these into 
account, but Roe seems to assume that the concept of evolution grasped by his non-scientist 
audience is simplistic; a skepticism which may or may not be justified.  
 184. See Tarek Majzoub et al., “Cloud Busters”: Reflections on the Right to Water in Clouds 
and a Search for International Law Rules, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 321, 351 (2009) 
(“[Chaos] theory relates to how the subtle variations in an environment make that system extremely 
difficult to understand and predict.”); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal 
Reality, 6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 88, 100 n.57 (2009) (“According to [chaos] theory, 
small differences can, after a number of repetitions, contribute to disproportionate effects down the 
road.”); Kristina A. Kiik, Comment, Quantum of Competence: Balancing Bivens During the War on 
Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2009) (“Chaos theory explains how small, initial changes in 
complex systems cause unexpected results.”); Ryan D. Wheeler, Note, The Supreme Court Lends 
States a Break: Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis and the Civil Responsibility 
Exception to the Negative Commerce Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 375, 400 n.104 (2010) (With chaos 
theory, “the outcome is subject to random chance.”). 
 185. Roe, supra note 180, at 642. 
 186. See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF EXCELLENCE FROM 
PLATO TO DARWIN 15-16 (1996). 
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selecting only upward-bound characteristics, stymies us from going 
down the hill.  We are stuck in a local equilibrium, unaware of the 
higher summit across the valley.  Survival does not imply superiority to 
untried alternatives.”187  Roe’s third embellishment is that of path-
dependence.188  Roe uses corporate legal structure to illustrate his points, 
but trust law fits equally well. 
One of Roe’s main points is that where there is more than one path 
to the result, and each is equally efficient, then path-dependence might 
explain why we have the one we have.189  We can use the ubiquity of the 
revocable trust and the increasing popularity of other forms of 
nonprobate transfer as an example.  Wills acts bar attempts at 
testamentary transfers without the use of a will.190  They sprung up not 
as constraining, but rather as enabling rules, because testamentary 
transfers, though desired by many property owners, were previously not 
permitted under the law.191  Wills acts permitted gratuitous transfers of 
property at death and offered the will to accomplish these transfers.  
Wills, in turn, had to meet certain formal requirements.192  But the path 
created by wills acts was found to be undesirable because it channeled 
all decedents’ estates into post-death administration called probate.  
Eventually, probate began to be seen as too burdensome so other ways 
of transferring property at death, avoiding the will, were instituted.  This 
was the beginning of a path around the wills acts.  The revocable trust 
became popular and other devices, primarily based on the third-party 
beneficiary contract, were also used.  So we now have bank accounts 
and brokerage accounts with pay-on-death features, much like we have 
insurance contracts and retirement accounts with fill-in-the-blank third-
party beneficiary designations.  Ironically, this ersatz system of 
transferring property at death, popularized to avoid the inefficiencies of 
probate, is itself increasingly inefficient in that it generally requires a 
 
 187. Roe, supra note 180, at 643. 
 188. Id.  The concept of path-dependence has been discussed in other legal scholarship.  See, 
e.g., Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606-22 (2001); Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence 
and the External Constraints on Independent State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811154.  It 
has also recently gained some traction in popular journalism.  See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Getting 
There from Here: How Should Obama Reform Health Care?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/01/26/090126fa_fact_gawande? currentPage=all (using 
the concept of path dependence to explain how health care has developed over the years).  
 189. See generally Roe, supra note 180, at 641. 
 190. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 228 (8th ed. 2009). 
 191. See id. at 226. 
 192. See id. at 226-28. 
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new and different transfer mechanism for each item of property 
transferred.193  In contrast, a will can transfer unlimited property 
interests.  A revocable trust can also transfer multiple property interests, 
but those interests must be transferred to the trustee during the lifetime 
of the settlor;194 a sometimes tedious extra step that is not required with 
the will. 
In retrospect, once it became apparent that probate suffered serious 
deficiencies, it would have been best to construct a complete 
alternative—to design a system with a single device, like a will, that 
avoided probate and the fragmentation inherent in our nonprobate 
property system.  And yet, we seem to be committed to the path we are 
on.  We are path-dependent on a fragmented system of transferring 
property at death. 
We are also on a unique path with respect to the functions and 
analyses of trusts.  The medieval “use,” upon which the trust is based, 
eventually led to the description of the device as a title-split, with legal 
title in the trustee and equitable title in the beneficiary.195  Importantly, 
contract law was not fully developed in the feudal times in which the use 
was created.  Today, it would make more sense to conceptualize the trust 
as a contract, with the beneficiary as a third-party contract beneficiary.  
Yet this is not how the trust is described, and not how it is analyzed.196 
Roe classifies path-dependent states into weak-form, semi-strong 
form and strong-form.  In weak-form path-dependence, at the time the 
path was chosen other paths would have worked equally well, but path-
dependence explains the one we are on.  In semi-strong path 
dependence, although the path we are on is inefficient, costs of change 
exceed the advantages.197  In Roe’s taxonomy, our system of will 
substitutes would probably qualify as a semi-strong form of path-
dependence.  The final form of path-dependence is strong-form.  Here, 
even though it would be advantageous to change the path, change is 
blocked by some impediment.198  It is this form of path-dependence that 
may be propping up the elective externalization function of trusts. 
 
 193. See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: 
An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 156-57 (2008). 
 194. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 233. 
 195. Id. § 1. 
 196. The influence of the title-split concept on trust law is comprehensively explored in Kent 
D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REV. 181, 184 
(2009). 
 197. Roe, supra note 180, at 650. 
 198. Id. at 651. 
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2. Strong-Form Path-Dependence 
I have argued that the externalities created by trusts result from at 
least two processes.  First, our ownership model of property, with its 
baseline of negative liberty, leads us to a line of jurisprudence that 
carries out the transferring owner’s intent over the interests of other 
parties.199  The settlor, in transferring her property to a trust, is presumed 
to have the power to disaggregate the sticks in the bundle, and thereby 
deny to the beneficiary any particular stick.  So alienability, as a stick in 
the ownership bundle, can be withheld.200  Second, and just as important, 
the fortuitous conceptualization of the trust as a title-split means that, 
regardless of how much benefit the trust beneficiary receives from trust 
property, we fail to see the beneficiary as the “owner” of that property.  
This is benign as far as administrative functions of ownership are 
concerned because the trustee, the “legal” owner, takes those on.  But 
where certain burdens of ownership are concerned, a vacuum can be 
created. 
Although we are dependent to some extent on any path we choose 
to take, mere path-dependence does not foreclose the possibility of 
change.  A new path, one that internalizes to the trust parties those costs 
that currently fall on outsiders, can still emerge.  But where trusts’ 
elective externalization functions are concerned, it does not appear that 
change is even being considered.  We do not seem to recognize that the 
path we are on is inefficient.  This suggests that strong-form path-
dependence may be at work here.  In strong-form path-dependence, the 
benefit of moving to a new path outweighs all of the costs of abandoning 
or modifying the prior path, yet we fail to veer from our current route.201  
 
 199. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 293 (“the process of construction ‘is primarily 
concerned with giving effect to the testator’s disposition in an instance in which his intention is 
unclear or unexpressed.’”) (citing GOODRICH AND SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 168 (4th ed. 
1964)); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2) (amended 2008) (stating that one of the underlying 
purposes and policies of the Uniform Probate Code is “to discover and make effective the intent of a 
decedent in distribution of his property.”); Id. § 2-805 (allowing a court to reform terms of a 
governing instrument “to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that the transferor’s intent and the terms of the governing instrument were 
affected by a mistake of fact or law.”).  See also Bostwick v. Hurstel, 304 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Mass. 
1973) (describing how “the unquestioned rule of construction . . . is to give effect to the testator’s 
intent where possible”); Daly v. Gaskins, 133 N.E. 886, 886 (Mass. 1922) (explaining how “it is the 
duty of the court to ascertain the intent of the testator from all the words in the will and then to give 
effect to that intent.”); Wait v. Belding, 41 Mass. 129, 133, 136  (1837) (stating that the purpose of 
the “law [is to] give effect to” the intention of the testator and that the “question [of interpreting the 
will] turns on the intent of the testator.”). 
 200. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 31. 
 201. See Roe, supra note 180, at 651. 
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In discussing strong-form path-dependence, Roe states that he can 
conceive of “only two path-created features that systematically impede 
change, [but] they are important ones:  information and public 
choice.”202  Here, there is reason to suspect that both of these specific 
impediments to a new path may exist.  Each, in turn, is taken up next. 
a. The Information Impediment 
Let us first consider the “information asymmetry” caused by the 
ownership model of property and the title-split conception of trusts.203  
The first step to correcting an errant proclivity is to recognize the error.  
But, as Roe points out: 
When a society goes down this path instead of that one, it develops a 
tacit information set, thereby creating an information asymmetry with 
the society it would have become had it taken the unchosen path.  If a 
society cannot think effectively about the alternative path because it 
lacks the vocabulary, concepts, or even belief that the other path could 
exist, then that society cannot consciously choose either to return to the 
branch point of the two paths (and then go down the other path) or to 
jump to the other path.204 
In trust law, our “tacit information set” derives from the ownership 
model of property, buttressed by the title-split fiction and its formalistic 
analysis.  The spendthrift trust is justified first from the standpoint of the 
settlor by our conception of ownership as a manifestation of our negative 
liberty.  Thus, we presume that the settlor, in alienating his property, can 
divide it up any way he chooses.  He is, after all, the master of his 
property, and he should be free to do with it what he wants without 
interference from third parties. In fact, allowing him to do so is said to 
be economically efficient because it creates incentives on the part of 
property owners to produce and create more property.205  The settlor’s 
intent angle, then, is rarely if ever questioned and is even posited to 
justify harm to the interests of persons not a party to the trust deal.206  It 
is seen as a necessary manifestation of ownership.  Second, the title-split 
fiction tells us that trust beneficiaries are not owners of property, but 
rather only benefit from it as directed by the transferor.207 They do not 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id.  
 205. See supra Part III.A. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Schenkel, supra note 11, at 183. 
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take on the burdens that we might otherwise associate with ownership.  
In other words, even if an owner of property must yield to the rule that 
gives judgment creditors access to that property, a trust beneficiary 
evades this rule by virtue of the title-split because his participation in the 
project is deemed to be limited to some sort of equitable benefit.  The 
information set created by the ownership model of property and the title-
split is reinforced by a jurisprudence that uses deductive reasoning to 
derive answers to conflicts based on these legal concepts.  We end up in 
a legal box that we cannot think our way out of because we lack the 
broader perspective necessary to do so.  We are constrained by our 
information set. 
b. The Public Choice Impediment 
Public choice is also at work here.  The donative trust creates 
economic victors who impose upon the political process, leading to 
legislation favoring, reinforcing, and strengthening those aspects of 
trusts that make them most beneficial to the parties to the enterprise.  
This increases incentives to create trusts, leading to more trusts, 
additional accumulation of economic benefits to trust parties, and, 
inevitably, more power in the political process.  Trusts create a number 
of economic beneficiaries, including trust companies, estate planning 
lawyers, and brokerage firms, all of whom stand to make money from 
either the forming, funding, or operation of a trust.  Robert Sitkoff 
and Max Schanzenbach conducted an empirical study based on data 
culled from reports submitted by trust companies to federal banking 
regulators in order to determine whether jurisdictions compete for trust 
funds by enacting laws favorable to trusts. 208  They demonstrated that 
trust legislation that creates additional opportunities for elective 
externalization by trusts brings substantial economic benefits to 
participants in the trust industry.209  In order to appreciate Sitkoff and 
Schanzenbach’s study, it is necessary to be aware of another opportunity 
for elective externalization created by the trust—that of externalizing 
certain tax costs normally attendant to donative transfers of property.  It 
works as follows:  the federal transfer taxes generally apply to property 
gratuitously transferred by a donor to a donee.210  Transfers during the 
 
 208. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: 
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 356 (2005). 
 209. Id. at 410-11. 
 210. 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006) (gift tax); Id. § 2001(a) (estate tax); Id. § 2601 (generation-
skipping transfer tax).  
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donor’s life are captured by the gift tax, while transfers triggered by the 
death of the donee are subject to the estate tax.  Any of such transfers 
may also implicate the generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax.  The 
transfer tax base is the aggregate value of the property transferred (for 
the estate tax that is all property beneficially owned at death) and the 
rate for the estate and GST taxes is forty-five percent.211  Although the 
vast majority of donors escape the transfer taxes altogether due to a very 
large credit against the taxes,212 high rates of tax create considerable 
incentives for those taxpayers with transfer tax exposure to engage in 
maneuvers to avoid the tax.  Enter the trust, which, if properly 
constructed, can externalize all of the beneficiary’s transfer tax cost. 
So long as certain known prohibited powers over the trust property 
are avoided, a trust beneficiary can enjoy a copious banquet of benefits 
from that property and still avoid federal gift and estate tax.  Consider 
the following nonexclusive list from which a beneficiary could have all 
or any combination:  a right to all of the income from the property,213 a 
right to so much of the principal as advisable under an “ascertainable 
standard” such as health, support, or education (or any combination 
thereof),214 or even for the happiness or other more whimsical standard 
so long as the beneficiary is not the trustee.215  And if access to the 
principal is limited to the cryptic “ascertainable standard,” the 
beneficiary can simultaneously serve as the trustee, even where the trust 
instrument gives the trustee unlimited discretion to interpret the standard 
and determine what distributions are needed.216  Courts will not 
intervene unless the beneficiary, who has now donned his notional 
trustee hat, abuses his discretion in an egregious or reckless manner.217  
 
 211. Id. § 2001(b)-(c).  The estate tax has been repealed for 2010, but the repeal contains a 
sunset provision meaning that, unless Congress acts before then, it will return with a higher 
effective rate and a lower “applicable credit amount” after 2010. 
 212. Although the estate tax has been repealed for 2010 (see id.), the amount that could be 
transferred free of estate tax in 2009 was generally $3.5 million per person or $7 million per married 
couple.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 2010(c) (West 2010). 
 213. Although any income actually distributed or earned but not distributed would be included 
in the beneficiary’s gross estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2006), the principal of the trust would not 
be included. 
 214. An unrestricted power in a decedent to withdraw trust property would be considered a 
“general power of appointment,” includable in the decedent’s gross estate for federal estate tax 
purposes under 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(1)-(2) (2006).  However, if the power is limited to an 
“ascertainable standard” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (2006), it is not considered to be a 
general power of appointment. 
 215. A power to distribute property in the decedent that is in the discretion of a third-party 
trustee is not a general power of appointment.  See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1(b) (2011). 
 216. See id. § 20.2041-1(c). 
 217. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 190, at 605. 
47
Schenkel: Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
110 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:63 
Acting as trustee, the beneficiary may also invest, sell, and reinvest the 
trust property, borrow against it, and generally make all those other 
decisions and take all other actions normally reserved to property 
owners.218  And although the tax at issue here is a tax on gratuitous 
transfers, the beneficiary—as beneficiary—may even make a donative 
transfer of the property during life or at death so long as he technically 
lacks the ability to transfer the property to himself, his estate, his 
creditors, or the creditors of his estate.219  Any other transferee in the 
world is fair game.  And yet, as the beneficiary is not the owner of the 
property, no gift or estate tax applies.  This state of affairs is made even 
more interesting when one considers that the only two parties that have 
any ownership interest in the property are the beneficiary and the 
trustee—yet the rule holds even where both roles are filled by the same 
party.  Given the potentially severe impact of the transfer taxes on those 
few to whom it applies, and the ease with which it can be avoided 
through the tool of the trust, one would naturally wonder why all the 
property of the very wealthy is not permanently ensconced in trust.  This 
is where the GST tax comes in. 
The GST tax is separate from the gift and estate taxes and applies to 
transfers to a generation that is two or more generations below the 
generation of the transferor.220  When Congress enacted the first GST tax 
in 1976, it intended that even if property was placed in a trust as 
described above, it would be subject to a transfer tax at the end of each 
generation of family owners.221  With respect to property transferred to a 
trust, even where the trust is drawn to carefully avoid gift and estate 
taxes to its beneficiaries, the trust is subject to the GST tax when 
distributions are made to “skip persons,” defined as those persons who 
are two or more generations below the generation of the transferor.222  
So no matter how long a trust lasts, it would theoretically be subject to 
federal transfer tax on each distribution to a skip person.  Of critical 
importance though, is that Congress gave each transferor a GST 
exemption—an amount the person can transfer during his or her lifetime 
free of GST tax.223  This exemption amount rose rapidly over the history 
of the GST tax and was most recently up to $3.5 million per person.224  
 
 218. Indeed, this describes the duties of the trustee.  Id. at 550, 552. 
 219. These powers do not amount to a general power of appointment under 26 U.S.C. § 
2041(2), and therefore do not result in inclusion in the decedent’s gross estate. 
 220. I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2011).  See also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 190, at 989. 
 221. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, pt. II (1976). 
 222. I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2011). 
 223. Id. § 2631 (2010). 
 224. Id. § 2010(c) (2010). 
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A trust funded entirely with GST-exempt property, because of this 
exemption, will stay GST-exempt regardless of how much the trust 
property appreciates. 
After the enactment of the GST tax, lawyers quickly learned that by 
funding a trust entirely with GST-exempt property, all transfer tax could 
be avoided for the duration of the trust.  As it happens, there is one 
venerable old law that acts as a temporal limitation on participation in a 
trust—the rule against perpetuities (“Rule” or “RAP”).  The Rule, which 
has been a feature of the common law for some 300 years and has 
modern statutory iterations,225 usually requires that property “vest” in 
someone within some time period—say ninety years or so.226  This 
“vesting” requirement is anathema to transfer tax avoidance because it 
effectively limits the duration of trusts.  But some state legislatures, 
apparently motivated by the prospect of increased trust business, have 
begun repealing their RAP statutes.227  This leads us back to the subject 
of Sitkoff and Schanzenbach’s study.  Essentially, the authors found that 
repeal of the jurisdictional RAP statutes responded to a desire not for 
“perpetual control” (the management scheme function of trusts), but 
rather to the use of the trust to avoid transfer taxes (the cost 
externalization function of trusts).228  Basically, lawyers could now draft 
trust instruments as described above, have their clients fund those trusts 
with GST-exempt assets, and subject the trusts to the laws of a 
jurisdiction that repealed the Rule.  That way, the trust could be 
“perpetual” and avoid federal transfer tax in perpetuity.  Sitkoff and 
Schanzenbach’s study found that beginning with the enactment of the 
 
 225. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-901 (amended 1997); PA. CONS. STAT. § 6104(b) (2008) 
(the “wait-and-see” approach). 
 226. Under the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, affected parties are entitled to 
“wait and see” whether the interests vest within the statutory period of ninety years.  UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-901(a)-(c) (amended 1997). 
 227. Delaware became the first state to do so in 1986.  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 
208, at 377.  
 228. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the 
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2466-67 (2006).  Schanzenbach and 
Sitkoff’s study confirmed the speculations of Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier, who earlier wrote, 
“The reason [for the perpetual trust] has little if anything to do with some wish on the part of 
wealthy people to control the lives of their unknown descendants; rather, it has to do with their 
interest in saving on federal transfer taxes imposed at the descendants' deaths, and on competition 
among the states to cater to that interest.”  Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the 
Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1314-15 (2003) (citing Ira M. Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is 
Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569 (2000)).  But see Joshua C. Tate, 
Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN L. REV. 595, 620-25 (2005) (maintaining that 
for settlors the control issue is more important).  Note that Tate’s speculation was before 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff’s study was published. 
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GST tax in 1986 through 2003, “a state’s abolition of the Rule increased 
its reported trust assets by about $6 billion and its average trust account 
size by roughly $200,000.”229  They concluded that Congress’s 
“enactment of the GST tax sparked the movement to abolish the Rule 
and the rise of the perpetual trust.”230  Jurisdictions compete for trust 
business by abolishing the Rule, which indirectly transfers wealth to 
jurisdictional players in the trust industry, such as banks, trust 
companies, financial firms, and law firms.231 
In sum, both the information asymmetry of our property paradigm 
and the title-split fiction, together with a vibrant interest group 
participation in the political process are helping keep us path-dependent 
on the elective externalization feature of trusts.  Strong-form path-
dependence is enabled when information and public choice impede 
change.232 The road around excessive cost-externalization by trusts 
begins with the recognition that these impediments are blocking a more 
efficient evolution of trust law.  Solutions can then be implemented. 
V. REDUCING ELECTIVE EXTERNALITIES 
This next part of the article presents a search for a resolution to the 
elective externalization problem created by trusts.  The analysis here is 
an attempt to determine under what circumstances these costs should 
instead be borne by the beneficiary, as the beneficial owner of the trust 
property.  For the most part, I will be discussing the proposed solutions 
in the context of the spendthrift trust, because that is the type of the trust 
chosen as an archetype.  The reader should keep in mind, however, that 
these analyses can be carried out with respect to any costs electively 
externalized by trusts.  The analysis begins with an approach along the 
traditional legal-analytical route.  This method is based on the common 
legal conception of property as a bundle of rights or “sticks.” 
 
 229. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 208, at 2467. 
 230. Id. at 2468. 
 231. Schanzenbach and Sitkoff estimate that the $100 billion in trust funds that moved by 2003 
as a result of Rule repeal generated as much as $1 billion in annual trustee fees alone.  Sitkoff & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 208, at 417. 
 232. In the case of the externalities created by trusts, there may also be a third type of 
impediment blocking a way around the path.  The cost-externalization function of trusts is supported 
from the theoretical side by elite groups, e.g. American Law Institute (see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003)), Uniform Law Association (see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2000)), and the 
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (see Duncan E. Osborne & John A. Terrill, II, 
Fundamentals of Asset Protection Planning, 31 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 319 (2006)). 
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/2
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
2012] EXPOSING THE HOCUS POCUS OF TRUSTS 113 
A. The Bundle of Sticks Approach 
1. The Sticks that Comprise a Property Interest 
A collection of appellate opinions applying a federal tax lien statute 
is useful in the type of legal analysis called for here as it very closely 
approximates our task.  The Drye233 line of cases concerns Internal 
Revenue Code § 6321,234 which provides that federal tax liens attach to 
“all property and rights to property . . . belonging to” a taxpayer.235  In 
applying this statute, case law makes clear that although state law 
determines the taxpayer’s interests in property, only federal law 
determines whether those interests qualify as property or rights thereto 
under the statute.236  This means that for purposes of the federal statute, 
the state law’s legal conclusions about the interests it creates are not 
relevant, only the parameters of the interests themselves.  So, for 
example, the fact that state law might conclude that a particular 
beneficial interest in a trust is not “vested” is not relevant; what is 
important is the actual bundle of sticks that comprise that interest.237  
Similarly, that a state law interest in a trust has been labeled merely 
“beneficial” or “equitable” would be disregarded; the court must go 
beyond state law legal fictions to get at the substance of the interests 
created.  If those interests raise the level of “property,” then the 
particular burden with which the statute is concerned (exposure to a 
federal tax lien) would be borne by the owner of that property.  
In Drye v. United States, a § 6321 lien against Mr. Drye was held to 
apply to an interest in his mother’s estate that was disclaimed by him,238 
 
 233. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999). 
 234. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2006). 
 235. Id.  That the question presented and its analysis by the Drye Court has application outside 
federal tax lien law has been recognized by more than one legal scholar.  See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 914-16 (2000). 
 236. See, e.g., Drye, 528 U.S. at 50 (“The question whether a state-law right constitutes 
‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ under § 6321 is a matter of federal law.”); United States v. Craft, 
535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“The federal tax lien statute itself ‘creates no property rights but merely 
attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 217 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that while 
the “bundle of rights” the taxpayer has depends on state law, the label the state attaches to them 
does not; federal law alone determines whether such rights amount to property or rights thereto for 
purposes of the tax lien statute).  As stated by the Drye Court:  “We look initially to state law to 
determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to 
federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or 
‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”  Drye, 528 U.S. at 58. 
 238. Id. at 52. 
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even though applicable state law (Arkansas), as applied to disclaimed 
property, indulged in the familiar legal fiction that the disclaiming 
beneficiary predeceased the decedent239 and thus that the transfer to the 
taker in default is directly from the decedent, not the disclaimant.  
Justice Ginsburg’s decision, delivered for a unanimous Court, 
emphasized that Mr. Drye had the choice of either inheriting the 
property or, in effect, transmitting it to a family member.240  It was this 
consequence of a choice to disclaim that apparently convinced the Court 
that the crucial interest in property was evident.241  The Court rejected an 
analogy pressed upon it by Mr. Drye—that disclaiming an inheritance 
was legally identical to rejecting a gift.242  It emphasized what it saw as 
the element of control a disclaimant has over property; that while 
rejecting a gift merely restores the status quo, disclaiming “channels” the 
property to the taker in default.243  Here, that taker in default was Drye’s 
daughter.244  Note how emphasizing this aspect of Drye’s power puts the 
focus on his limited right to alienate the property (to his daughter, in this 
 
 239. Id. at 49 (summary). 
 240. Id. at 60-61. 
 241. See also United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 732 (1985) (holding 
that a joint owner’s power to withdraw entire joint bank account constitutes “property or rights to 
property” despite that state law curbed the rights of the joint owner’s creditors); United States v. 
Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56 (1958) (holding that the power to compel payment of life insurance cash 
surrender value is property or rights to property). 
 242. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60-61. 
 243. Id.  Though it is not of much import for our purposes here, this distinction seems 
unsatisfactory.  The power to accept the devise or reject it, even without the ability to channel it to 
another, should represent enough benefit and control to constitute a right to property.  Of course a 
finding that rejecting a gift constitutes rights to property in the gift presents the potentially 
intractable practical problem of determining whether the donor has actually given up control. 
 244. Perhaps Drye would have been a more sympathetic litigant had he not been party to a 
scheme devised to ensure he could benefit from the property despite the disclaimer.  His daughter 
transferred the disclaimed property to a spendthrift trust, under which the trustee (Drye’s lawyer) 
could make distributions at his discretion for the “health, maintenance, and support” of the trust 
beneficiaries, one of whom was, yes, Mr. Drye.  Id. at 49, syllabus.  Though the case is of limited 
instruction here, the Sixth Circuit was called upon to apply § 6321 to a beneficial interest in a trust 
in the case of Bank One Ohio Trust Co., N.A. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173, 173, 176 (6th Cir. 
1996).  The taxpayer was a mandatory income beneficiary under a trust containing a spendthrift 
provision and a forfeiture provision.  The effect of the forfeiture provision was that under state law, 
an attempted attachment of the beneficiary’s income interest would cause the trust to “cease and 
determine as to such beneficiary.”  Id. at 174 (citing Article IV, § C(6)).  The trustee argued that the 
beneficiary, due to the forfeiture provision, no longer had any right to income and therefore no 
property or rights to property under the trust to which the lien could attach.  Id. at 175.  As for the 
spendthrift provision, the court pointed out that “state-law restraints on the alienation of property 
rights created under the state law do not affect the status of such rights as ‘property’ or ‘rights to 
property’ within the meaning of those terms as used in” the statute.  Id. at 176.  The court held that 
the forfeiture provision did not present a problem either, because the lien arose long before any 
termination of the beneficiary’s income interest in the property.  Id. at 177. 
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case).  Does this mean that the stick that we might call alienation should 
be the key—any right to alienate, even to one person, will expose the 
property to the creditor who is privileged to proceed based on this one 
stick held by the debtor?  This would seem to be conceptually consistent 
with state law on creditors’ rights under trusts.  After all, a spendthrift 
trust is described as a trust under which the beneficiary has no voluntary 
or involuntary alienation sticks.  But a subsequent case indicates that 
such an interpretation would be too narrow. 
United States v. Craft245 also involved the application of § 6321, 
and here the Court continued its scrutiny of the sticks in the bundle as 
the key to finding an interest in property under the statute.246  In Craft, 
the issue was whether the lien could attach to the husband’s interest in 
property owned with his wife as a tenancy by the entirety.247  The legal 
fiction confronted here was the familiar common-law one that a married 
couple is one person248 in the eyes of the law; therefore, neither spouse 
has a separate interest in the entireties property.249  Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion first pushed the fiction aside and pointed out the similarities 
between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety.250  Later, she 
dismissed the fiction altogether and leaned on the property-as-bundle of 
sticks analogy,251 enumerating the sticks held by the taxpayer in an effort 
to determine whether the collection of sticks in this particular bundle 
qualified as property for purposes of the federal statute.252  Specifically 
 
 245. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). 
 246. Id. at 276. Cf. Drye, 528 U.S. at 61 (“the important consideration is the breadth of the 
control the taxpayer could exercise over the property.”) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 83 (1940)). 
 247. Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. 
 248. Id. at 281. 
 249. The Court pointed out that Blackstone did not even “characterize the tenancy by the 
entirety as a form of concurrent ownership at all.  Instead, he thought that entireties property was a 
form of single ownership by the marital unity.”  Id. (citing John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: 
The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 38-39 (1997)). 
 250. See generally Craft, 535 U.S. at 280. 
 251. Id. at 282.  The concept of property as a bundle of sticks has been largely attributed to 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.  See Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights 
Experimentalism as Obligation to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1425 n.74 
(2009) (“Credit is usually given to the legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld for the famous bundle of 
sticks metaphor.”).  See also SINGER, supra note 154, at 82 (“The legal-realist model recognizes that 
the sticks in the bundle of rights can be unbundled or disaggregated and distributed among several 
parties. . . .This view [was] adopted by such legal realists as Wesley Hohfeld. . . . The relational 
nature of rights was recognized by Wesley Hohfeld in historic law review articles in 1913 and 
1917.”). 
 252. Among the sticks (“rights,” said the Court) found by the Court were:  
the right to use the property, the right to exclude their parties from it, the right to a share 
of income produced from it, the right of survivorship, the right to become a tenant in 
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acknowledging that the taxpayer could not “unilaterally alienate the 
property,”253 the Court nonetheless held that “[t]here is no reason to 
believe . . . that this one stick—the right of unilateral alienation—is 
essential to the category of ‘property.’”254  In applying the federal tax 
lien law to these state law interests, the opinion called the rights to use, 
receive income from, and exclude others from property “some of the 
most essential property rights.”255  The Court concluded that these rights, 
because they indicate a high degree of control, might be sufficient to 
allow the lien to attach, and were certainly sufficient when coupled with 
the right to alienate the property with the co-owning spouse’s consent.256 
The approach taken by the Court in Drye and Craft is transferable 
to the question of under what circumstances a beneficiary’s interest in a 
trust should be immune from third party interference.  Rather than 
relying on the title-split fiction and the absence of the alienation stick in 
the beneficiary’s bundle, the question could be presented as whether the 
particular beneficial interest or collection of interests rises to the level of 
essential “interests in property” that should trigger standard third party 
rights in that property.  That this would change the Courts’ approach to 
beneficial interests is evident but can be made clearer if we re-analyze 
one of the important state law cases regarding beneficial trust interests 
with this approach in mind. 
The question before the Minnesota Supreme Court in the United 
States v. O’Shaugnessy case, decided before both Drye and Craft, was 
also whether the beneficiary’s interest in a discretionary trust amounted 
to “property” or “rights to property” against which a § 6321 lien could 
attach.257  Though the Minnesota Supreme Court wrongly applied state 
law to the question,258 its analysis can be used pedagogically to illustrate 
 
common with equal shares upon divorce, the right to sell the property with the 
respondent’s consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to place 
an encumbrance on the property with the respondents’ consent, and the right to block 
respondent from selling or encumbering the property unilaterally.  
Craft, 535 U.S. at 282. 
 253. Id. at 284. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 283. 
 256. Id.  
 257. See United States v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Minn. 1994).  Note that this 
question, as it was one of federal law, should not have been certified to the state court.  The case 
was therefore decided because of an error in analysis by the district court. 
 258. The question certified to the court by the U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, was 
whether, “[u]nder Minnesota law,” the beneficiary of a discretionary trust has property or rights to 
property.  Id.  The statute itself, along with interpretations provided by Drye and other cases, make 
clear that this approach is wrong.  See Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in Post-
Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 415, 427-28 (2002) (explaining that state law inquiry 
54
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/2
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
2012] EXPOSING THE HOCUS POCUS OF TRUSTS 117 
the reasoning that justifies debtor protection for beneficial interests in 
discretionary trusts.259  The trust instrument in O’Shaugnessy gave the 
trustees discretion to distribute principal and income to the beneficiary 
as they “see fit.”260  The Minnesota court said that because the trust 
instrument put all discretion in the trustees to distribute the property, the 
beneficiary could not compel distribution and so neither could the 
creditor, who stood in the shoes of the beneficiary.261  But if we instead 
apply an analysis like that used by the Supreme Court in Drye or Craft, 
we will be required to consider whether the sticks in the beneficiary’s 
bundle aggregate into a threshold degree of use and benefit that triggers 
a correlative duty on the part of the holder of the user and beneficiary to 
particularly situated third parties.262 
The Supreme Court in both Drye and Craft did this by looking first 
at the separate sticks in the bundle.  For example, in a passage in Drye 
that reveals reasoning that could be applied to costs externalized by a 
trust, the Court said that lack of a right of unilateral alienation is not 
necessarily essential to determining that one has no “property 
interest.”263  So while states have relied on alienation as a determinative 
factor in creditors’ rights law, the federal perspective, at least in the 
context of whether a certain collection of rights rises to the level of a 
property interest, dispenses of that as a dispositive marker.  Finding an 
appropriate stick or collection of same using the Drye and Craft analysis 
involves looking at other sticks.  Like the taxpayer in Craft, the trust 
beneficiary in O’Shaughnessy had the use of the property and could 
receive income and principal distributions from it.  He also had a special 
 
should be limited to “what the taxpayer could do as to the property or prevent others from doing—
and should not also include the classification or definition of the interest as section 6321 property or 
not.”).  But see United States v. Green, 201 F.3d 251, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that because 
state law determines the “rights” a taxpayer has in property, and applicable law (Pennsylvania) 
provided that tenants by the entirety property is not available to the creditors of just one spouse, a 
section 6321 lien could not attach.).  Cf. Craft, 535 U.S. at 276.  See also infra Part III. 
 259. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 190, at 544. 
 260. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d at 576. 
 261. Id. at 577.  This is also the position of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) 
(1935):  
[I]f by the terms of a trust it is provided that the trustee shall pay to or apply for a 
beneficiary only so much of the income and principal or either as the trustee in his 
uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to pay or apply, a transferee or creditor of the 
beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to pay any part of the income or principal. 
 262. To borrow from Professor Hanoch Dagan in his comprehensive analysis of the Craft 
decision, the “decision maker[] must ask whether it is justified that a certain category of people,” in 
our case, trust beneficiaries, “will enjoy a particular right, privilege, power, or immunity over a 
category of resources . . . as against another category . . .”  Dagan, supra note 56, at 1533. 
 263. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 55 n.7 (1999). 
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testamentary power of appointment.264  Does the discretionary trust 
beneficiary have the right to use, receive income from, and exclude 
others from property—all factors Justice O’Connor deemed more 
important than the right of alienation?  An argument can be made that, 
because the trustee has some degree of discretion in making 
distributions, these rights do not exist.  But this argument ignores that 
the trust cannot benefit the beneficiary unless distributions are made, and 
even where the trust is “discretionary” (discretion for distributions 
resides in trustee) it is almost always expected that distributions will be 
made.  That is the only reason donative trusts are created after all—to 
benefit beneficiaries.  This point gains additional traction when we 
consider that case law across jurisdictions provides that even where a 
trustee is given sole and absolute discretion in making distributions 
under a trust instrument, that discretion is never in fact absolute.  Courts 
have consistently held that, regardless of how strongly the language used 
in the trust instrument vests sole discretion in the trustee, trustees may 
not exercise their discretion arbitrarily or unconditionally.265  And it 
hardly makes sense to pretend that absolute discretion means just that 
when creditors’ rights are concerned but then allow a beneficiary to 
compel a distribution under some other standard.  The discretionary trust 
beneficiary does have some level of enforceable right to the use and 
benefit of the trust property.  So even as a deductive analytical process, 
the conclusion that the beneficiary cannot compel a distribution is 
flawed.  Justice O’Connor’s markers for a property interest exist at some 
level in the discretionary trust interest. 
If we apply the same type of analysis to a spendthrift trust, we find 
that the spendthrift provisions of the trust, because they only prevent 
alienation of the beneficial trust interest, would not prevent creditor 
access to the trust.  It is true that the alienability stick is absent from the 
beneficiary’s bundle, but the Craft opinion tells us that that stick is not 
essential to the recognition of the interest as property.  (Of course, 
making the interest “involuntarily” inalienable as well would settle the 
question, but it is settling the question it simultaneously begs.)266  So we 
 
 264. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d at 577. 
 265. “Even where the only direction to the trustee is that he shall ‘in his discretion’ pay such 
portion of the principal as he shall ‘deem advisable,’ the discretion is not absolute.”  Marsman v. 
Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (1991).  “That there is a duty of inquiry into the needs of the 
beneficiary follows from the requirement that the trustee’s power ‘must be exercised with that 
soundness of judgment which follows from a due appreciation of trust responsibility.’”  Id. (quoting 
Boyden v. Stevens, 188 N.E. 741, 743 (1934)).  See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c) (amended 
2004); Newman, supra note 36, at 605-06. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73. 
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would need to look at the other provisions of the trust instrument, along 
with general trust law, to determine whether the “spendthrift” trust in 
fact forecloses the rights of third parties to proceed against the trust 
property. Creditor access would certainly extend to any mandatory 
benefits held by the beneficiary, such as a right to all of the trust income.  
The effect of discretionary benefits would proceed under the analysis as 
set out above for discretionary trusts; the spendthrift provisions would 
have no effect.  But even if the trustee could theoretically withhold all 
distributions, this reveals a serious problem with the “identifying the 
sticks in the bundle” approach:  it fails to answer the question whether 
one who actually benefits from property in the manner of an “owner” 
should be able to avoid certain burdens associated with that benefit.267 
2. The Essential Sticks in Ownership 
The Craft line of cases attempts to connect property burdens with 
those persons whose rights in the property meet some threshold level of 
an “interest.”  It involves a search for those sticks in the bundle that are 
crucial to meeting this threshold.  Another approach is similar in that it 
attempts to define something called “substantive ownership.”  Although 
substantive ownership is at least nominally and perhaps conceptually 
different from § 6321’s interest in property, the process by which we 
find it is the same.  Section 9.1 of the Restatement (Third) of Property, 
which addresses the spousal elective share generally, provides that a 
non-community property jurisdiction whose elective share statute 
applies to the decedent’s “estate” includes any property the decedent 
“owned in substance” before the decedent’s death.268  The comment to 
section (c) identifies certain critical sticks in the bundle, explaining that 
property is owned in substance if the decedent has the “power to revoke, 
withdraw, invade, or sever, or to appoint the decedent or the decedent’s 
estate as beneficiary.”269  The origins of the decedent’s substantive 
 
 267. See Dagan, supra note 57, at 1533.  Professor Hanoch Dagan criticizes the Craft majority 
for merely counting the sticks in the bundle to determine if there are enough for ownership, 
replacing one formal exercise with another.  According to Dagan, the opinion does not address “the 
question of whether a governmental tax authority should be able to recover the liability of one 
spouse from the marital estate held by both spouses as tenants by the entirety.”  Id.  Dagan does not 
want to throw away the bundle analysis, because it helps “liberate us from the imaginary 
methodology of deduction from frozen forms.”  Id. at 1534. But he emphasizes that counting the 
sticks misses the whole point, which is to engage in explicit normative analysis. 
 268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 9.1(c) (2003). 
 269. Id. § 9.1(c) cmt. j.  Comment j lauds a Massachusetts case, Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 
572 (Mass. 1984), as the “first breakthrough” case for this position.  The Restatement is intended to 
and does go further than that decision.  The rule in Sullivan (the elective share applies to property 
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ownership interests are not relevant to the analysis; instead, “the 
objective is to equate property owned in substance with probate 
property, which includes property that the decedent acquired before or 
after the marriage by gift or otherwise from someone else.”270  The 
Restatement’s position then, as applied to a beneficial interest in a trust, 
makes a clean break with the title-split fiction.  The Restatement’s 
concept of ownership in substance is informed by reference to the 
purpose of the elective share statute, which it interprets as protecting the 
surviving spouse against disinheritance.271  From this perspective, it 
follows that an elective share statute should not be frustrated by simple 
resort to a legal device that does not in fact reduce the beneficial 
economic value of the property in the decedent spouse’s hands.272  If the 
property has value to the decedent, then that value should be shared with 
the surviving spouse.  This is pertinent to our inquiry because 
substantive ownership in this context means that the property interest is 
sufficient for this particular ownership burden (exposure to the spousal 
elective share) to apply.  All we need do is expand the application of the 
concept to any standard ownership burden, such as availability of one’s 
substantively-owned property to one’s general creditors.  In the context 
of a trust, any beneficiary who substantively owns the trust property—
who has the power, derived from the trust instrument or from trust law 
generally, to revoke, withdraw, invade, or sever, or to appoint the 
beneficiary or the beneficiary’s estate as beneficiary—would expose the 
trust assets to claims of the beneficiary’s creditors. 
With this in mind, we can look again to the spendthrift trust—this 
time to determine exactly what sticks are present in the beneficiary’s 
interest.  The Uniform Trust Code, in section 502, requires that a 
spendthrift trust withhold one stick from the beneficiary’s bundle:  that 
which would permit voluntary alienation of the beneficial interest.273  Of 
course, section 502 provides that involuntary transfer must be restrained 
 
the decedent controlled for his benefit) was interpreted in the Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335 
(Mass. 2003), decision as being limited to property originally owned by the decedent, and 
transferred by the decedent to the trust.  See also Schenkel, supra note 11, at 199-202. 
 270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 9.1(c) cmt. j (2003). 
 271. Id. § 9.1(c) cmt. b.  Apparently the drafters adhere to the so-called economic partnership 
theory of marriage, which would promote equal ownership of marital assets. 
 272. And yet the Restatement takes inconsistent views on the nature of a beneficial interest in a 
trust.  While section 9.1 of the Restatement (Third) of Property ignores the title-split fiction in favor 
of the concept of beneficial ownership, section 60 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts follows the 
traditional conceptual path.  Id. §§ 9.1, 60. 
 273. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a) (2000); Subsection (b) goes on to provide that merely 
designating the trust as “spendthrift” in the governing instrument is sufficient to prevent voluntary 
or involuntary alienation.  Id. § 502(b). 
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but that is not really a benefit, but rather a burden, of a property 
interest.274  Whether the beneficiary has any of a number of other 
sticks—power to revoke, withdraw, invade, or sever, or to appoint—
makes no difference.  Many, if not most, spendthrift trust interests would 
constitute substantive ownership under the Restatement’s definition. 
But the Restatement’s conception of ownership in substance, while 
it clearly achieves a superior result over a conceptual title-split analysis, 
like the Craft analysis, runs the risk of offering the courts one legal 
fiction in exchange for another.  Though the Restatement never goes 
beyond the listing of nonexclusive examples in explaining what exactly 
ownership in substance is, the concept is presumably triggered where the 
decedent has enough control that she can appropriate the property for her 
own interest.  Because a trust beneficiary holding any one of several 
powers enumerated in the comment would be able to exercise the crucial 
degree of control over the property, this list, and hence the ownership in 
substance concept, are clearly informed by the proposition that, as 
respects consequent liabilities, control equals ownership.  This position 
certainly has appeal, but the danger is that a court armed with this 
conception of ownership in substance could take an approach that ends 
up being a mere search for control, rather than making the normative 
inquiry that inspired the concept of substantive ownership in the first 
place.  And so we again come to the major problem with the bundle of 
sticks approach.  The mechanical process of first acknowledging 
property as a bundle of sticks, and then choosing which sticks or 
combination thereof should tip the scale in favor of debtor vulnerability 
obscures our task.  Our task is to determine whether we want laws that 
allow those certain types of beneficial property interests we find in trusts 
to impose certain costs on unrelated third parties.275  Whether we look 
for certain crucial sticks as the Supreme Court did in the Craft line of 
cases, or whether we look for other sticks as the American Law Institute 
does in the Restatement of Property, we are engaging in a formalistic 
exercise that dodges the hard questions with artificially constructed 
deductive analysis. 
 
 274. For a discussion of this issue, see Part III. 
 275. SINGER, supra note 144, at 11 (“The idea of balancing interests is a useful one, but it does 
not quite get at what is at stake in constructing property law.  What is at stake is a vision of social 
life.”).  
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B. Beyond the Bundle of Sticks 
1. Statement of the Problem 
Simply examining sticks in the property bundle leaves us short; we 
need a normative method of analysis that allows us to determine whether 
and to what extent the elective externalization of costs by trusts is 
justified.  When a debtor defaults on a debt, the creditor can proceed 
against the property of the debtor.  The property-owning debtor 
ultimately pays the cost of the debt.  The creditor is entitled to the 
benefit of his bargain because the law provides for it.  Likewise, a tort 
victim can obtain a judgment against a tortfeasor, and the victim can 
look to the tortfeasor’s property for payment.  One way or another, the 
property-owning tortfeasor bears the cost of the debt.  In each of these 
instances, the legislature has imposed a liability rule on the property 
owner.  But if the debtor or tortfeasor’s property is in a spendthrift trust, 
the creditor or tort victim must bear the cost of the default or tort.  The 
spendthrift trust reverses the law with respect to these creditors and 
places the liability on the creditor and the tort victim.  So one of the 
state-mandated costs of owning property is transferred to unrelated third 
parties at the election of the transferor.  The question we should be 
asking is:  should a donative transferor of property be permitted to 
externalize certain legal burdens of ownership to outsiders simply 
because the transferor elects to do so?  The approach explicated next is 
offered as a starting point for a new way at looking at the problem of 
elective externalization of trusts. 
2. A Priority Rules Approach 
Hanoch Dagan, in an article directed at the Craft decision, offers an 
intriguingly fresh approach to this type of question.  Dagan emphasizes 
property as “institutions” rather than solely either forms (in our case, 
equitable or beneficial interests in property) or bundles (as in the Drye 
and Craft analysis).276  So instead of looking at particular sticks in the 
property bundle as was done in Craft, he stresses the importance of 
putting the property interests into some sort of institutional context and 
discovering what he calls their “normative-historical” implications.277  
This has the advantage of getting away from the framing issues 
associated with the conventional property paradigm as well as the bundle 
 
 276. Dagan, supra note 57, at 1558-70. 
 277. Id. at 1570. 
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of sticks view. With this as a foundation, where third party rights in the 
property are implicated, he proceeds to a two-part analysis.  First, he 
looks at how those third party rights affect the internal perspective of the 
property interest.  Then, he assesses the impact on interests external to 
the property owner’s interest. 
To demonstrate how this might be done in the context of Craft, he 
starts with placing the entireties property at issue there into institutional 
context, tracing its history and finding that it is “heterogeneous”; it is 
defined differently across the states, and such “demonstrates the 
impossibility of deductive formalism.”278  He takes the position that 
marriage should be viewed as an egalitarian liberal community and says 
that the legal decision-maker should focus on how the rights of the 
married persons in property best promote the community.  He expends 
considerable ink on this but concludes that tenants by the entirety is 
“second best” to community property and that judges should nudge it 
towards a better regime when the opportunities arise.279  He concludes 
that laws that support marriage as an egalitarian liberal community 
should support joint management and control.280  With the institutional 
foundation established, he proceeds to the next stage:  the two-part 
internal and external analysis. 
This portion of the analysis is drawn from the primarily economics-
based approach to what Dagan refers to as “legal accidents”281 set out in 
a 1991 article by Menachem Mautner.282  Mautner suggested a system of 
priority rules for resolving liability questions derived from accidents 
law.  Mautner’s article concerns what he calls “triangle conflicts,” which 
involve three parties:  a first-in-time claimant to an asset, a second-in-
time claimant to the same asset, and a wrongdoer who engages in a 
transaction with each of the other two parties.283  According to Mautner, 
 
 278. Id. at 1531. 
 279. Id. at 1542. 
 280. Id. at 1543.  See infra Part III. 
 281. Dagan, supra note 57, at 1544-57.  Dagan draws this analysis from Menachem Mautner, 
“The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote 
Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 154 (1991).  Mautner’s article extrapolates from earlier work in 
“factual” accidents, such as that of Guido Calabresi.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 15 (1970).  A number of other scholars have 
approached the subject.  See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort 
Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2000); Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and 
Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2004); John Fabian 
Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 6, 19 
(2006). 
 282. See generally Mautner, supra note 281, at 154. 
 283. Id. at 97. 
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“[t]riangle conflicts may well be viewed as accidents, while accidents 
may be viewed as events involving priority conflicts.”284 
The first priority is ex ante efficiency.  This priority calls for a rule 
that would impose liability on the party that could avoid the conflict at 
the least cost.  The idea here is that the “least cost avoider” should be 
incentivized to prevent the conflict.  The second priority is to “promote 
the ex post policy of minimizing the losses suffered.”285  This priority 
would prefer the party who is “likely to suffer the greater loss if the 
other party prevails.”286  As a third priority, the rules should be 
implemented in a way that minimizes litigation and other uncertainty 
costs.  The idea here is that it is better to implement standard rules for 
typical cases than resort to case-by-case adjudication with its consequent 
costs.287  Mautner maintains that ex ante rules are best and that the ex 
post rule would generally be used only when the parties’ ability to 
prevent the conflict is in doubt.288  However, Dagan adds that in some 
types of cases, relative harm and concerns about distributive justice are 
prominent enough that we should focus on ex post solutions.  “Insofar as 
resorting to ex post efficiency (relative harm) considerations stresses 
distributive effects by emphasizing the ascription of winners and losers 
to specific social categories, it gains further significance, and we should 
be wary of renouncing it.”289 
It seems to me that a fourth priority should be added here.  Ex ante 
rules create opportunities for free-riding.  For example, in the Craft 
situation, the spouse with the tax debt is using the marital property form 
as a shield.  Given a rule that imposes liability on the third party ex ante, 
one spouse could run up all manner of debts with impunity.  So while 
Dagan’s analysis focuses on the competition between the innocent 
spouse and the Internal Revenue Service, it is just as importantly (and 
perhaps even more importantly given the planning implications) a 
competition between the guilty spouse and the Internal Revenue Service.  
Any tenancy by the entireties property protected will benefit the guilty 
spouse by at least one-half.  This priority recognizes that one tactic used 
by planners is to identify entry points for free-riding.  A decision to 
require joinder in Craft situations will create incentives for debtor 
spouses to place their property in tenancy by the entirety so that in the 
 
 284. Id. at 102. 
 285. Id. at 101. 
 286. Id. at 100. 
 287. Dagan, supra note 57, at 1545. 
 288. Mautner, supra note 281, at 100. 
 289. Dagan, supra note 57, at 1547. 
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event of tax debt, they can shield their interests in the property from the 
legitimate tax creditor.  This calls for another dimension to the 
normative analysis.  Rules that create outsized opportunities for free-
riding should be avoided.290 
a. The Institutional Context of Elective Externalization 
As Dagan did with respect to the entireties estate, this priority 
system can be applied to the elective externalization of trusts.  We would 
start by examining the institutional context of the trust to determine the 
implications to the trust parties of permitting the externalization of costs 
by the trust.  As has been stated, I am going to assume that the elective 
externalizations of trusts are always good for all parties to the trust:  the 
settlor, the beneficiary, and even the trustee.  This is merely an 
assumption for purposes of the analysis; more work in this area may lead 
to the conclusion that one or more of the parties are not well-served by 
certain externalization effects.  For example, restricting the power of the 
beneficiary to alienate the spendthrift trust interest impinges upon the 
beneficiary’s autonomy; this seems undesirable from at least one 
perspective.291  But by indulging in the presumption that externalization 
is always good for the trust parties, we can determine whether those 
externalizations would be justified in a best-case scenario.  I do not 
predict that the ultimate conclusions drawn will change based on the 
internal analysis. 
Nonetheless, it is helpful to put the internal ramifications of the 
trust to its parties into some institutional context.  The externalization 
effects of trusts on the trust parties are primarily justified as side effects 
to expressions of the donor’s intent, arising from an owner’s broad rights 
of control over property owned.292  Settlors give positive effect to their 
rights by disaggregating owned property interests in the course of the 
donative transfer, assigning management duties to the trustee and 
parsing the beneficial interests in myriad ways across one or more 
beneficiaries.  Under the management scheme function of trusts, settlors 
can impose an almost unlimited array of conditions and limitations on 
 
 290. Dagan’s position is that incentives to acquiring property as tenants by the entirety solely 
to exempt it from the claims of contract creditors of the debtor spouse are actually salutary because 
those creditors will respond by requiring joinder.  This “channels the married couple . . . toward the 
more desirable governance regime of joint management,” which is better for the institution of 
marriage.  Dagan, supra note 57, at 1550. 
 291. See supra Part III.B.  See also Hirsch, supra note 54, at 48-49; Epstein, supra note 73, at 
971. 
 292. See supra Part III. 
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the benefits the beneficiary can receive from the trust property.  Thus, an 
owner can impose quantitative limitations on a beneficial interest, by 
giving a particular beneficiary a right to only the income of the trust, for 
example, or perhaps to a specified dollar amount or percentage of the 
trust property.  Bringing in the services of the trustee, the settlor can 
introduce an element of discretion into the beneficiary’s quantitative 
benefit and even add a qualitative element, perhaps tying that benefit to 
a standard such as that deemed advisable for health or education.  
Restrictions on alienation of the beneficial trust interest reduce the 
quality of that interest in the hands of the beneficiary.  Finally, temporal 
restrictions can be imposed, giving the beneficiary an interest for life, a 
term of years, or until the beneficiary reaches a certain age. 
Restrictions on benefit and access to trust property imposed by the 
settlor, because they are positive expressions of the settlor’s negative 
liberty interest, are subject to very few restraints.  Trusts cannot be for 
illegal purposes of course, and public policy can at times come into play.  
A trust that subjects the beneficial interest to a condition that violates 
public policy will generally not be enforced; the trust will be 
implemented as though the condition did not exist.293  Until recently, the 
rule against perpetuities, in either its common law or statutory iterations, 
acted as a temporal restriction on trusts in the vast majority of 
jurisdictions.294  For the most part, however, the settlor’s intent controls.  
Presumably, except in the few types of situations mentioned, the settlor’s 
ownership rights over property are perceived as more deserving of legal 
protection than any rights that might accrue to a beneficiary who is, after 
all, receiving the beneficial trust interest gratis.  The prescription below 
 
 293. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 6, § 211 n.68.  See also Lewis v. Green, 389 So. 2d 235, 
243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a condition in a will that stated that the decedent’s 
granddaughter was to be raised by certain persons after the death of her mother was invalid for 
violating public policy); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 123 S.E.2d 115, 133 (Ga. 1961), overruled in part 
by Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982) and Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 67 (2008) 
(holding that a prenuptial trust made in consideration of the husband’s release from a duty to 
support and from all claims against his property, and provisions pertaining to liability in the case of 
a divorce, were void as against public policy); In re Estate of Allister, 545 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (Sur. 
Ct. 1989) (holding that a provision in the will authorizing the retention of assets by the trustee in his 
uncontrolled discretion without liability for any decrease in value was offensive to public policy as 
an attempt to exonerate the trustee from the duty of exercising reasonable care and prudence); In re 
Estate of Robertson, 859 N.E.2d 772, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the provision in the 
wife’s testamentary trust awarding a life estate in her residence to her husband “until he remarries or 
allows any female companion to live with him who is not a blood relative” was an invalid condition 
in restraint of marriage). 
 294. See supra Part IV. 
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recognizes the settlor’s ownership rights, but also recognizes that those 
rights are not absolute. 
b. Implications of Elective Externalization to Insiders and 
Outsiders 
The spendthrift trust externalizes the economic costs of most credit 
defaults (which occur by contract) and tortious acts (where the creditors 
are involuntary victims).  In some states, claims of a beneficiary’s 
children, spouses, and former spouses for support and maintenance are 
exempted from the externalization rules (special cases).295  Applying a 
priorities approach, each of those sample categories can be addressed 
separately.  The “conflict” we are trying to resolve concerns the dispute 
between the beneficiary and the outsider over rights to the beneficial 
trust interest. 
(1) Contract Creditors 
Perhaps most creditors of the spendthrift trust beneficiary are those 
who have extended credit to the beneficiary on contract.  The majority of 
contract creditors are presumably relatively sophisticated business 
people who would be able to determine whether the debtor has sufficient 
available income and assets to afford repayment.296  This is a point 
addressed earlier in this paper.297  Most commercial contract creditors 
would seem to fall into two broad categories.  The first category consists 
of those who will be sure to obtain a lien on any property interests 
necessary to protect their loan.  These types of creditors probably 
comprise the party in an ex ante emphasis who is the least cost avoider 
because they can and usually will determine what their risk is and take 
steps to protect against that risk.  Then there are the credit card type 
creditors who follow a different business model—one based on 
achieving profitability despite a relatively high number of defaults.298  
Spendthrift trust beneficiaries are arguably part of the cost of doing 
business for these types of creditors.  They do not necessarily expect to 
get paid by all debtors and their business model does not require it.  
These creditors are probably also the least cost avoiders because they 
 
 295. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 (2000). 
 296. See Hirsch, supra note 54, at 61. 
 297. See supra Part III.C. 
 298. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 384-92 (2007).  
65
Schenkel: Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
128 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:63 
have decided upon a business model that requires them to do only 
cursory investigation into the credit-worthiness of a particular creditor. 
Under the first priority of ex ante efficiency then, the contract 
creditor should perhaps be fingered as the party that could avoid the 
potential conflict at the least cost.  These creditors are often quite 
aggressive in marketing their credit and can presumably gain access to 
information about consumers, such as credit reports and assets owned, at 
a relatively low cost.  However, as pointed out earlier in this paper, the 
spendthrift attributes of a trust are not generally apparent without a 
review of the trust instrument itself—something that would increase the 
cost of obtaining information about the debtor.299  Nonetheless, the 
incentive created by the ex ante rule imposing liability on the contract 
creditor should be sufficient to alert the contract creditor that the credit 
should be priced at a rate that factors in the risks associated with default.  
Thus, an ex ante rule shielding the spendthrift trust interest from claims 
of general contract creditors can arguably achieve the most desirable 
result. 
When we bring in the second priority of minimizing the overall loss 
suffered, we must note that there are costs associated with imposing 
liability on the contract creditor.  Persons other than the contracting 
parties suffer from trust externalizations.  For example, because 
judgment-proof debtors reduce creditor profits, the cost of credit rises 
for all, not just the spendthrift trust beneficiary.  Costs of goods and 
services also rise to reflect the increased cost of credit.  Tax subsidies to 
the unpaid creditor also affect the tax burden on the public at large.300 
It should also be mentioned that where particularly unsophisticated 
creditors are concerned, the ex ante rule may not work as intended.  
Because this “least cost avoider” rule presupposes that the party on 
whom liability would fall will take precautions to avoid that liability, it 
assumes that the contract creditor is sophisticated enough to modify its 
behavior, if necessary, to prevent the conflict.301  Also, creditors that 
have insufficient bargaining power to modify their agreements with 
debtors may not respond to the incentives created by the ex ante rule.  
Other creditors for whom the rule would not work might include those 
who, due to lack of education or other constraints, might remain ignorant 
of an ex ante rule.  Compounding the problem is that those creditors who 
are least likely to respond to the ex ante rule are also those who would 
 
 299. See supra Part III.A.  
 300. These points were mentioned in Part III. 
 301. Dagan, supra note 57, at 1545. 
66
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/2
7- SCHENKEL_MACRO_FINAL[1].DOCM 2/24/2012  9:27 AM 
2012] EXPOSING THE HOCUS POCUS OF TRUSTS 129 
be most vulnerable to its negative distributive effects.  Socioeconomic 
class and education levels are positively correlated,302 meaning that an 
ex ante rule placing liability on these creditors may aggravate existing 
income and wealth disparities.  Because these are also the parties who 
would likely suffer the greatest relative loss, an ex post rule would be 
more appropriate for these categories of contract creditors. 
So while a general rule imposing liability on most contract creditors 
might be acceptable if the costs to the rest of us are perceived to be de 
minimis, exceptions should be carved out for certain types of 
particularly vulnerable creditors.  Keeping in mind our third priority of 
minimizing litigation and other costs of an uncertain rule, any exceptions 
to the general rule should be clearly spelled out.  Creditors who do not 
fall into these particular categories should be ineligible for a 
reconsideration of the general rule ex post. 
(2) Tort Victims 
Tort victims differ from contract creditors in that they do not come 
to their predicament voluntarily.  Although tort victims can at times 
minimize their vulnerability to injuries or other losses caused by 
negligence, control rests primarily in the hands of the tortfeasor.  Ex ante 
efficiency would strongly suggest that the trust beneficiary is best suited 
to avoid this conflict.  Ensuring that trust beneficiaries remain personally 
liable for damages caused by their tortious acts maximizes incentives to 
avoid negligent or risky behavior.  Moreover, tort rules have been 
exhaustively analyzed from a legal-economic perspective.303  Many of 
these rules ensure that the party who would suffer the greatest loss is 
preferred.  To allow spendthrift trusts to externalize the cost of tort 
liability flies in the face of these foundational legal-economic principles 
of tort law.  So imposing liability on the trust beneficiary who commits 
torts prevents these rules from being circumvented.  Finally, imposing 
liability on the trust beneficiary reduces litigation and uncertainty costs 
from their current state.  This is because, while rules exist in many 
jurisdictions that exempt certain types of involuntary creditors from the 
 
 302. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, EDUCATION & SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
(2010), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-education.aspx.  
 303. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 23, at 1089-90; POSNER, supra note 17; MERCURO & 
MEDEMA, supra note 18, at 107; see also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic 
Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1501-02 (2006); John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & 
Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 668 (1998). 
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debtor protection features of spendthrift trusts,304 those rules can be 
uncertain.305  Litigation remains the only way for parties to determine 
where the loss lies.  A hard and fast rule permitting involuntary tort 
creditors to pursue beneficial trust interests would reduce these costs. 
As an aside, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, although it does not 
create an exception for tort creditors, does address the situation briefly in 
its comment.  It states that a trust beneficiary who displays “willful or 
fraudulent conduct or persistently reckless behavior” should perhaps be 
unable to protect the beneficiary’s spendthrift trust benefits from victims 
of her behavior.306  This would seem to acknowledge that where a 
volitional element to tortious actions is evident, incentives to rein in 
risky behavior are appropriate.  So here, an ex ante rule placing liability 
on the trust beneficiary should certainly be most effective in avoiding 
the conflict.  
(3) Special Cases 
Some spendthrift statutes carve out exceptions for certain classes of 
creditors.  For example, the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) exempts 
 
 304. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7743(b) (2006) (exempting a beneficiary’s child, any 
person who has a court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance, a judgment 
creditor who has provided services for the protection of the beneficiary’s interest in the trust, and a 
claim of the United States or the Commonwealth as allowed by federal law); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
58a-501 (2006) (allowing the court to “authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach 
the beneficiary’s interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary or other means”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-503(b) (2006) (permitting a beneficiary’s 
child who has a judgment or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance to attach 
distributions made to the beneficiary or for the benefit of the beneficiary); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14-10503(A) (2009) (allowing “a beneficiary’s child who has a judgment or court order against the 
beneficiary for support or maintenance, or a judgment creditor who has provided services relating to 
the protection of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust” to obtain a court order attaching distributions 
to or for the benefit of the beneficiary). 
 305. See, e.g., In re Estate of McInerny, 682 N.E.2d 284, 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that 
a guardian is not permitted to circumvent the spendthrift provision in the trust when acting as a 
creditor); Zeoli v. Comm’r Soc. Serv., 425 A.2d 553, 559 (Conn. 1979), superseded by Taylor v. 
Taylor, 978 A.2d 538 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) and by statute as stated in Viera v. State, No. CV 90-
0438151-S, 1991 WL 273329, at *3 (Conn. App. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991) (holding that the assets of a 
spendthrift trust were not intended for the plaintiffs’ general support and therefore distributions 
could not be compelled and a refusal of the trustee to make a distribution was not an abuse of his 
discretion.  The department of social services was precluded from terminating medical assistance 
payments based on the assets held in the spendthrift trust.); In re Lackmann’s Estate, 320 P.2d 186, 
191 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (requiring the trustee to pay from the spendthrift trust the reasonable 
cost of the trust beneficiary’s care at a state mental hospital); Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 
412-13 (N.H. 2001) (holding that a minor who was sexually assaulted by the trust’s beneficiary was 
barred from recovering tort judgment from the assets of the trust by the spendthrift provision 
contained in the trust).  
 306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. a(2) (2003).  
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children, spouses, and former spouses of the trust beneficiary who have 
a claim for support or maintenance.307  The comment to this section does 
not explain the policy behind this rule but does point out that it is “in 
accord” with the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and many state laws, as 
well as federal bankruptcy law.308  The Restatement contains a similar 
exception for “support of a child, spouse, or former spouse.”309  The 
comment states that the exceptions listed are not exclusive and that case-
by-case evaluation in light of policy considerations might be 
appropriate.310  Addressing the policy consideration involved in the 
spousal and child support exception, the comment merely states 
summarily that beneficiaries should not be able to enjoy benefits from 
the trust while neglecting support obligations.311 
In the case of child support, consideration of ex ante efficiency 
would seem to fall squarely on the trust beneficiary as the least cost 
avoider.  Children who are eligible for support would not likely be 
capable of responding with self-help to the incentives created by a rule 
placing liability on them.  Spousal support disputes can arise in 
situations where it would be difficult to determine who would be the 
least cost avoider.  On the one hand, the trust beneficiary could in most 
cases be induced to provide adequate support for the spouse or former 
spouse by an ex ante rule.  On the other hand, a rule placing liability on 
the spouse or former spouse could also work in some situations.  
Overall, however, because the spousal support rules are designed to 
ensure that the affluent spouse provides support for the poorer one,312 
placing liability on the trust beneficiary seems appropriate.  Such a rule 
 
 307. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b)(1) (amended 2005).  The UTC also excepts “a judgment 
creditor who has provided services for the protection of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust,” as well 
as “a claim of th[e] State or the United States to the extent a statute of the[e] State of federal law so 
provides.”  Id. § 503(b)(2)-(3).  
 308. Id. § 503 cmt.  
 309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(a). 
 310. Id. § 59 cmt. a(2).  The section also excepts goods and services for “necessities or for the 
protection of the beneficiary’s interest in the trust.”  Id. § 59(b).  The Uniform Trust Code contains a 
similar exception.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503. 
 311. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. b.  
 312. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 31 So. 3d 532, 535 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (“In a proceeding for 
divorce, the court may award an . . . allowance to a spouse based on the needs of that spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the standard of living of the spouses during the marriage.”); 
In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa 2005) (considering such factors as: the 
earning capacity of the party seeking alimony, educational background, employment skills, work 
experience, and the feasibility of the party seeking support to become self-supporting at the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage); In re Marriage of Coote, 831 P.2d 32, 347 (Or. Ct. App. 
1992) (considering factors such as the poor health of the wife, and the disparity in education, work 
experience, and earning capacity).  
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would also avoid the costs associated with determining the outcome on a 
case-by-case basis.  Those costs would affect the poorer spouse 
disproportionately and this would presumably be the spouse seeking 
support. 
(4) Other Elective Externalizations 
The above is a suggested starting point for a normative approach to 
curbing the elective externalizations of trusts.  Further development of 
this approach should yield additional insights.  Spendthrift trusts were 
used here as a sample for illustration of the potential application of this 
approach.  It could certainly apply to other externalizations.  For 
example, trusts have been used in some jurisdictions to externalize the 
cost to the estate of the elective share statutes.313  Analyzing these effects 
under this model would be particularly interesting as it dovetails with 
issues surrounding marital property forms. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We can classify the accomplishments of private donative trusts into 
two distinct categories:  that of providing a prospective management 
scheme for gifts, and that of externalizing certain costs of property 
ownership.  Each of these trust functions represents a positive expression 
of the oft-cited maxim that “the donor’s intention is given effect to the 
maximum extent allowed by law.”314  But identifying the legal principles 
that mediate donative intent can prove difficult and controversial.  For 
example, heated debate currently flares in the academy over an aspect of 
the management function of trusts.  This dispute concerns how much 
settlor-directed deviation from statutory trust investment standards 
should be permitted.315  One defender of a mandatory investment 
standard for trusts contends that bright lines must be drawn to preserve 
an objectively determined benefit to the beneficiaries—the whole 
purpose of the donative trust.316  Under this view, the law should restrict 
a trust settlor’s donative intent when its positive expression would be 
 
 313. See Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299, 305-06 (Mass. 1945), abrogated by Sullivan v. 
Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (Mass. 1984); Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 
2003). 
 314. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003). 
 315. Compare Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, 
and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2008), with John H. Langbein, 
Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 375, 377 (2010). 
 316. Id. at 377. 
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“demonstrably harmful to the interests of the beneficiaries.”317  
Meanwhile, an advocate of relegating the trust investment rule to default 
status contends that its evolving form is so misguided that it threatens to 
send settlors scrambling in search of alternatives to the trust.318  Under 
this view, objective tests for benefit to the beneficiaries are misguided; 
instead, the law should defer to the settlor’s interpretation. 
Each side warns of impending doom if the other view prevails, yet 
each side sounds a false alarm, designed to draw attention to the urgency 
of attending to its view.  Trusts will survive this debate irrespective of 
whose view wins this round.  That is because the sides merely represent 
different paths to the same goal:  that of preserving the trust as a 
management device.  As events play out, modification of rules directed 
at the management function of trusts will trigger an initial shift in one of 
two directions:  the trust will either respond more effectively to the 
demands of its constituents, in which case the wisdom of any 
amendments will be confirmed.  Or, the revisions will reduce the utility 
of the trust to its parties—a development that will simply prompt further 
changes and eventually a return to a sort of shaky equilibrium.  So this is 
not a debate about threats to the trust’s existence, but rather rule-
tinkering that showcases the ongoing process of the trust’s legal 
evolution. 
In contrast, this paper calls for another type of legal limit to trust 
settlors’ expressions of intent.  This concerns the trust’s effects on 
particular outsiders or society as a whole, and represents trusts at their 
worst—tools for externalizing burdens associated with property 
ownership.  Spendthrift clauses, for example, shift the cost of debt-
default and tort claims back onto the claimants and the public at large.  
Other trusts externalize transfer tax costs of property transfers.  Recent 
trends in trust law exploit and exacerbate trusts’ cost-externalization 
functions.  Repeal of rules against perpetuities permits the creation of so-
called dynasty trusts, designed solely to perpetuate shifting of transfer 
tax burdens to those outside the trust scheme,319 resulting in tax 
expenditures on behalf of the trust beneficiary.  Repeal of temporal 
restrictions on trusts also perpetuates the superior judgment-proof 
property interests of spendthrift trust beneficiaries.  Finally, statutes 
enabling self-settled debtor-protection trusts further exploit the trust’s 
cost-externalization function.320 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. See Cooper, supra note 315, at 1171-77. 
 319. See supra Part IV. 
 320. See supra Part III. 
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The overarching normative principle driving the trust is that 
property owners should be free to alienate their property as they 
choose.321  Donors, therefore, should have the power to disaggregate 
bundles of transferred property, reassigning benefits and even burdens 
associated with that property.  The trust gives this proposition positive 
expression through the rule that the donor’s intention is generally given 
maximum effect.  Trusts carry this out by imbuing the trustee with an 
agency responsibility in relation to both the settlor and the beneficiaries.  
Trusts should minimize agency costs and are found generally to do so, 
thus performing serviceable work as management devices, carrying out 
their normative function.322 
But another normative claim is that costs of economic activity 
should be internalized.323  Indeed, one theory has it that private property 
emerged solely to internalize the costs associated with attaining benefits 
from property.324  And yet trusts are often employed solely to externalize 
certain costs of property ownership.  The net effect of the cost-
externalizing function of trusts is that they create superior classes of 
property interests—long-term, even perpetual, interests that are free 
from judgments and tax claims.  Superior classes of property interests 
upset the balance negotiated by years of laws intended to distribute 
rights and obligations across property interests.  They are also inimical 
to property as a meritocratic and egalitarian social institution. 
If one accepts the normative proposition that a donor should be able 
to withhold benefits from and attach conditions to the enjoyment of 
donated property, then trusts function well as a scheme for 
accomplishing the donor’s purpose.  But laws that leverage the trust’s 
ability to externalize costs should be subject to restraining principles.  
Here is where we come full circle with current debate over the Uniform 
Trust Code.  On one level, that debate is about whether our sacred 
normative principle should be curbed when, by some putatively 
objective standard, it withholds a minimum level of benefit to the 
beneficiaries.  My prescription does not resolve that problem in the 
context of its application to the relative strengths of the parties to the 
trust.  Instead, it draws the lines at a point where carrying out the donor’s 
intent imposes too great a cost on outsiders to the trust deal.  Rather than 
implementing rules that increase these costs, we should be searching for 
 
 321. See supra Part III. 
 322. See Sitkoff, supra note 41, at 683-84. 
 323. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 704 (2003); 
Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 704 (1989). 
 324. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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mediating principles.  Instead, recent trends in trust law focus on 
dumping the reasonable costs of property ownership onto others.325  A 
generally agreed-upon normative stop on the principle that the donor’s 
intent controls will resolve most of these problems.  Laws should reduce 
the social costs of trusts, not leverage their benefits to the few who can 
enjoy them. 
 
 325. See supra Part IV.B.2.  
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